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Executive Summary 
In light of new EU market rules adopted as part of the Clean Energy Package, responsive 
and energy-efficient consumers are likely to play a crucial role in the challenging transition 
to a low carbon energy system. This is especially true for smart consumers who have access to 
distributed energy resources (DER) assets, such as demand response, solar photovoltaics, storage, 
electric vehicles and heating appliances. With the ‘internet of energy’, interconnected smart 
consumers can trade on both sides of the market, either directly or through an intermediary such 
as an energy service provider, an aggregator or an energy community.  
Understanding the necessary conditions for the development of local energy markets 
with the active participation of DER is essential. Most techno-economic models predict that 
electricity markets will increasingly rely on decentralised generation, demand response and 
localised system management. These new commercial and regulatory challenges will require a 
smarter and more flexible system.  
The report focuses on the business opportunities and regulatory challenges emerging in 
the ‘internet of energy’, in which local consumers, producers and system operators 
(TSOs and DSOs) trade increasing amounts of DER. 
Following an introductory assessment of general trends and key drivers of electricity consumption, 
this report analyses several international case studies representing innovative business 
models and regulatory arrangements where DER are actively involved.  
One of the issues identified is the problem of externalities arising from the activity of 
new market actors. While the emergence of aggregators as new market players can facilitate and 
promote the supply of flexibility services, it can also generate inefficiencies in the system. These 
inefficiencies may be caused by unplanned imbalances in the system (for which financial 
compensation will be required) or by limiting the ability of traditional suppliers to provide a stable 
and reliable supply to retail consumers (by cherry-picking consumers with the most profitable load 
profile). To correct for this potential externality some form of compensation would be required 
which correctly accounts for the opportunity costs and lost revenues incurred by retailers. 
Trading platforms have emerged as systems that can facilitate an efficient use of DER. 
However, the evidence analysed raises doubts as to whether sufficient financial benefits 
will be available to consumers in order to motivate their engagement with a potentially 
complex system which might require the modification of longstanding habits. Bringing 
together smart meter technology, blockchain and apps could lead to energy transactions being 
tailored to reflect both the attributes of distributed energy resources and the preferences of 
consumers and prosumers. However, transaction costs and unobserved costs incurred by 
consumers will have to be negligible. If not, the differential between a Feed-in-Tariff (FiT) or other 
subsidies and the market price will be squeezed to such an extent that only non-price factors (e.g. 
altruism, localism, environmental preferences) will drive consumers’ willingness to participate in 
P2P systems.  
Despite the expectations about wide-ranging opportunities offered by blockchain as a 
decentralised payment system, doubts remain about its suitability for the energy system. 
Furthermore, general concerns remain about public acceptance of this new system in relation to 
the protection of privacy and data management issues which can arise with automated systems. 
The report also discusses the different proposals for DSO-TSO interactions that allow the 
trade of flexible services provided by DER under different regulatory and market 
contexts, in the United Kingdom, Australia, New York and Europe. We observe that in all 
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these cases an expansion of the DSO’s roles, capabilities and coordination with the TSO 
is required. However, the analysis of the different approaches shows that most 
jurisdictions have not yet identified their preferred organisational set-up, including inter 
alia whether a central coordinator is necessary, and whether this should be the DSO, TSO or a third 
party. The applicability of one case or another will depend on each jurisdiction’s existing regulatory 
environment, market structure and needs. A cost benefit analysis should help to identify the 
relative costs of different options, but many benefits and costs are hard to quantify. Key 
differences across Member States, such as the number, size and independence of the DSOs, should 
be taken into account in such a study.  
The research confirms that the current network tariff regime is not optimal in a future 
smart energy system and that tariffs should be more directly linked to costs. A more 
advanced tariff structure becomes feasible in a smart electricity network: tariffs can become time- 
and location-dependent and could change in response to local network congestion. To achieve this 
goal, the report highlights some of the trade-offs that are faced in setting tariffs, and makes a 
number of recommendations.  
One of these recommendations, which is not dependent on smart meters, is to increase 
the capacity tariff (€/kW) while reducing the volume tariff (€/kWh). This is beneficial as 
marginal costs are more closely determined by capacity needs and less so by energy volume. 
Another important point is that DSOs could also rely on ancillary service markets for flexibility, in 
which they procure local flexibility services from distributed energy resources, either directly or 
through aggregators. The proper functioning of those flexibility markets requires clear baseline 
consumption and production levels. Those baselines are ideally based on network quantities that 
are contracted between network users and the network operator and will therefore require a 
network tariff which specifies a demand (or supply) profile with penalties for deviations from this 
profile.  
In addition, the abolition of net-metering and a shift towards capacity tariffs may reduce 
cross-subsidisation from poor consumers to rich consumers and will improve the fairness 
of the tariff structure.  
The report however warns that, in the long run, when the costs of storage and local 
generation are expected to drop further, local energy communities might decide to 
partially or fully disconnect from the distribution network and operate on a stand-alone 
basis. The cost of the distribution network will then have to be covered by the remaining network 
users who will see their energy bills increase as a result. This could lead to a “death spiral” 
where more customers leave the distribution network (unlikely in northern Europe), network assets 
become stranded, the distribution network becomes obsolete and goes bankrupt, and only small 
island grids remain.  
The report concludes by considering the importance of creating the right incentives for 
DSOs in the context of the digitalisation of smart networks. This task faces a number of 
challenges which may require a new regulatory framework, but may also entail significant changes 
in the market structure and the allocation of responsibilities. The report lists both the 
challenges (e.g. capital vs operational costs, new tasks and new skills, prevention of 
cross-subsidies and discrimination, innovation, etc.) and concrete remedies, including 
three different market structure options for DSO-TSO cooperation. 
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1. Introduction 
In several jurisdictions worldwide, policymakers are actively discussing the role that smart and 
energy-efficient consumers can play in the challenging transition to a low-carbon energy system, 
particularly in relation to their ability to provide flexibility services, independently or through 
intermediaries. This report investigates the business opportunities and regulatory challenges 
emerging in the ‘internet of energy’, in which local consumers, producers and system operators 
trade increasing amounts of distributed energy resources (DER). Part of this emerging landscape 
are smart consumers, who can either trade themselves, or via intermediaries (retailers, 
aggregators, or communities). However, several studies have shown that traditionally, residential 
consumers have not actively participated in retail markets. Thus, questions about the mechanisms 
via which consumers offer their resources to the market are critical for energy markets with active 
participation of distributed energy resources. In order to address these questions, the report 
considers the role of price and non-price signals and the characteristics of emerging markets for 
DER, with trading platforms and energy communities allowing buying and selling of distributed 
energy products and services.  
As energy systems become increasingly decentralised and characterised by high penetration of 
intermittent sources, distributed networks and DER themselves need to become smarter so that a 
range of markets for flexibility can be facilitated. In turn, centralised generation and the TSO role 
in the system are likely to be diminished, while new market platforms and business models will be 
established, creating challenges for traditional utilities and regulators. This report seeks to 
investigate these challenges and identify potential solutions, by reviewing the evidence of 
demonstration projects and regulatory interventions that have recently emerged as a result of the 
increasing decentralisation of energy systems. The report has three main objectives. First, to 
investigate the design of existing local energy markets and trading platforms, including the 
incentives schemes to trigger consumer participation, from selling excess generation to the grid to 
peer-to-peer trading. Second, to assess the role of TSOs and DSOs in promoting the development 
of efficient markets with distributed energy resources. Third, to identify some of the regulatory 
challenges that may arise as a result of the transition to a decentralised energy system with a high 
penetration of renewable generation. 
This report reviews evidence about the existing projects involving consumer engagement in energy 
markets through participation in demand response schemes or ancillary services markets. We also 
consider examples of regulatory reforms aimed at creating the conditions for the development of 
efficient markets for flexibility services, by offering appropriate incentives for DSOs and TSOs to 
optimally procure such services at the lowest economic and environmental cost. The case studies 
presented in the report provide recent examples of DER trading, either with the grid or, through 
private wire systems in US and European jurisdictions. 
The report first provides an overview of the market trends and the legal framework established by 
the European Commission in the recently-approved Clean Energy package (CEP). This section also 
discusses how the increased penetration of intermittent renewables and DER have made both 
supply and demand conditions less predictable compared to a centralised system dominated by 
dispatchable technologies. Section 2 summarises the key features of the EU’s CEP, by briefly 
describing the directive’s provisions and guidelines relating to consumers engagement in the 
energy market and to the larger role that DSOs are expected to play in a more interactive and 
decentralised energy system. Section 3 discusses the main findings from the academic literature 
and official reports, and provides a description of the key features of several case studies of 
innovative business models and regulatory arrangements, relating to markets where DER are 
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actively involved. Some key lessons are identified. Section 4 evaluates the different approaches of 
the interaction between DSOs and TSOs in key jurisdictions, in order to promote the participation 
of DER in the provision of balancing and ancillary services. Section 5 explores the trend in network 
regulation with a focus on distribution networks and the impact that these can have in the 
deployment of the internet of energy. Section 6 closes with some conclusions and key 
recommendations emerging from our analysis.  
1.1. General trends 
Trend 1: An increased amount of weather-dependent power supply  
The shift of electricity production from conventional, fossil-fuel based electricity supply to a system 
dominated by renewable and clean energy sources is one of the pillars of the EU’s climate strategy. 
Figure 1 shows the increase in renewable energy sources for electricity production in the European 
Union.1 Renewable energy sources contributed to 29% of the EU’s electricity production in 2016 
and its CO2 output from fossil fuel use has decreased by 10% since 2005 (EEA, 2018). 
Figure 1: Renewable energy source development in the EU  
  
Source: EEA, 2018, Figure 2.5, p.22 
The greatest share of renewable production comes from wind energy, solar energy and 
hydropower. All of these production types are intermittent, meaning that their output is volatile 
and depends on hard-to-predict outside factors such as weather conditions.  
The increased reliance on intermittent renewable energy sources (I-RES) raises some questions. In 
particular, it is unclear how a European weather-dependent electricity system will continue to 
develop as this dependency may severely affect security of supply. In a recent paper, Ravestein et 
al. (2018) analyse the impact of climate change on future electricity production, given different 
                                               
1 Note that this figure comes from the EEA 2018 report on renewable energy in Europe (see Figure 2.5 p.22). It shows 
the actual EU energy renewable consumption from 2005 to 2016 as well as the 2017 estimated consumption.  
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scenarios of renewable generation capacity in the EU. Specifically, they find that the difference in 
weather conditions caused by the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) - one of Europe’s most important 
drivers of weather variability - can induce median differences of 20-30% in the yields of I-RES in 
high wind production regions. These findings underscore how weather will be a very important 
variable in any high-renewables scenario.  
Moreover, this effect of weather dependency will be unevenly distributed across the EU, as can be 
seen in Figure 2.  
Figure 2: Variable renewable energy share in total electricity generation by country 
 
 
Source: Eurostat database, IRENA (2018). Own elaboration. 
The figure shows the share of intermittent generation in 2030 under a reference case (i.e. the 
continuation of existing policies) as well as a more ambitious case reflecting the realisable 
technology potential. It shows that some countries, such as Cyprus, Denmark, Portugal or Ireland, 
will be affected more by the volatility introduced by weather phenomena. Meanwhile, countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia will continue to rely heavily on dispatchable 
generation sources. 
Finally, note that an increase in weather dependency will not occur solely on the production side; it 
will impact both sides of the market, as the demand for electricity becomes increasingly volatile 
due to the growing use of electric heating. 
Trend 2: Growing number of distributed energy resources 
A second noticeable trend is the development of distributed generation, which enables consumers 
to become prosumers by selling their surplus electricity to the grid. The most common type of 
distributed generation is rooftop photovoltaic (PV) solar power. Figure 3 shows the share of 
residential PV in comparison to total solar production in different countries.2 It shows that while 
                                               
2 This figure comes from the Global Market Outlook for Solar Power (2018-2022), see Figure 27 p.72 and provides an 
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residential PV has a small share of total PV production in countries such as Romania or Spain, it 
represents a large share in Belgium, the Netherlands or Austria. 
Figure 3: Comparison of solar PV segments 
 
Solar Power Europe, 2018, p.72 
Overall, the technically feasible potential for rooftop PV in Europe is extremely high with a total PV 
potential of 500 GW in EU urban areas but also extremely unevenly distributed across Europe (Huld 
et al., 2018). 
Change of paradigm and value of flexibility  
These two changes (among others) have led to a change in the supply-demand paradigm. For a 
long time, even after liberalisation and regulation of the European electricity market, power 
markets were designed with the assumption that supply should follow the demand. Indeed, 
demand for electricity has historically been stable and proven to be inelastic in the short run. 3 
But the development of decentralised production as well as the increased weather dependency of 
energy supply is currently pushing for a new paradigm, where demand is adjusting to the 
intermittent supply. Indeed, supply has become less elastic. A large of share of traditional power 
plants are being phased out. While “clean” electricity sources such as wind or solar PV are 
inherently intermittent, storage capacity is unlikely to fully compensate supply volatility, at least in 
the short term. The viability of a future green power market crucially depends on different 
innovative ways to increase the elasticity of demand. 
                                               
3 Even though, consumers were still actively involved (through their balancing responsible parties).  
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This switch in paradigm has led to an empowered, flexible consumer (or prosumer) the so-called 
“smart consumer’. This new actor will provide value not only to the household itself but to all 
participants in the power market.  
First, the active consumer can greatly contribute to the security of the electricity system. In the 
current centralised system, the TSOs are struggling to transmit the electricity produced by 
intermittent sources, to the load centres that are often located far away (see for example Germany 
or Sweden). In order to avoid congestion, they have to intervene in the market with costly actions. 
For instance, in Germany, total congestion management4 has increased from €58.6m in 2010 to 
€859.4m in 2016, with a peak of €1141m in 2015 (Joos and Staffell, 2018). By increasing the 
share of distributed generation and storage, pressure on the transmission system could be relieved 
and the frequency of congestion events could be reduced.5 
Second, clean but intermittent electricity generation could realise its full potential in a more flexible 
system. Currently, spikes in renewable generation can lead to the curtailment of wind or solar 
power plants if they generate at times of low demand (e.g. high wind speed during the night). In a 
system in which consumers provide distributed storage (i.e. through their EV-batteries, for 
example) and react to price signals through smart meters, this potential would not be wasted as 
households could shift their electricity consumption into hours of high generation.  
This load shifting would also be desirable from a market efficiency standpoint. Currently, a 
significant part of electricity demand is inelastic throughout the day and unresponsive to price 
signals. In a system where consumers can react in real-time to price signals, the volatility of 
electricity prices would be reduced. For example, electric car owners would refrain from charging 
their batteries during peak hours since high electricity prices would disincentivise them from doing 
so. However, this would not be the case for fast charging because customers would want to charge 
their vehicle quickly, then the potential for smart charging is very low (CERRE, 2019b). 
Additionally, more reactive consumers would add some competitive pressure on the dominant 
producers.  
Finally, the emergence of the prosumer could lead to an increase in renewable energy capacity as 
the incentive to invest in rooftop PV and storage technology would be higher.6 Such investment 
may be done for savings reasons but also for so-called “warm glow” reasons - the emotional 
reward that households receive for directly contributing to the environment.7 Allowing self-
production, direct trade between consumers and coordination within energy communities, may 
activate consumers.  
1.2. Clean Energy Package  
European energy markets have been liberalised since the second half of the 1990s8. Several 
European Regulations and Directives provide the regulatory framework for the internal energy 
market, which are then implemented by Member States. They have been revised regularly, and the 
European Commission has just finished its third overhaul, the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ 
                                               
4 Total costs comprise: total curtailment compensation payments, net costs of redispatch and costs of reserve plants.  
5 Distributed generation may also increase congestion in the (distribution) network and require additional investments, 
if generation is insufficiently responsive to network congestion. Wolak (2018) reports empirically how additional solar 
power increases the distribution costs in California.  
6 Note that under a cap and trade program with a constant CO2 cap, decentralized production will not affect total CO2 
emissions, but might make more stringent future caps possible.  
7 See Andreoni (1990) for a definition of warm glow. The emergence of energy communities also suggests that some 
customers are interested in acquiring a certain level of autarky from the grid. 
8 For further details about progress with liberalisation in the EU see Pollitt (2019) and Chyong (2019). 
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package.9 In this section, we discuss how EU regulation affects energy consumers and also 
highlight some recent developments.  
The focus of the first three energy packages (1996-2009), was on founding the internal energy 
market: the introduction of competition for generation and supply, ensuring non-discriminatory 
access to distribution and transmission networks, improving cross-border trade and establishing a 
governance structure (e.g. national and international regulators). The position of small energy 
consumers - households and small and medium-sized enterprises - has only gradually received 
attention. Where earlier regulations focused on consumers as rather passive agents requiring 
protection, newer iterations view consumers more as active market participants.  
Consumers were still assumed to be rather passive in the Second Electricity Directive 
(2003/54/EC), which obliges Member States to take measures regarding customer protection and 
public service obligations. It also allowed Member States to introduce measures for Demand-Side 
Management (DSM). The original goal of Demand-Side Management was to improve energy 
efficiency on the demand side, thereby reducing the need for additional investments in production 
or networks. Demand Side Management already existed in the pre-liberalisation period as a 
requirement for the regulated vertically integrated utilities. Under the Directive those 
responsibilities could be given to the regulated DSOs. It was defined (Art. 2.29) as a global or 
integrated approach aimed at influencing, “the amount and timing of electricity consumption, to 
reduce primary energy consumption and peak loads by giving precedence to energy efficiency, or 
other measures”. The system operators are well placed to trade-off network investment and the 
cost of DSM projects. Moreover, as they are typically not selling energy products, implementation 
of DSM measures by system operators does not distort competition. However, DSM provides only 
limited incentives for innovation of business models by suppliers. In the Recast Electricity Directive, 
Demand Side Management is no longer mentioned.10 The focus has shifted towards consumer 
responsiveness. Coordinating network and production capacity with consumer demand while at the 
same time improving system efficiency is being addressed by more active participation by 
consumers in energy markets.  
Energy consumers are treated as active participants, starting with the Energy Efficiency Directive 
(2012/27/EU).11 Their role is developed further in the Clean Energy Package. Central to this 
development is the promotion of Demand Response. Demand Response is defined in the recast 
Electricity Directive (Art. 2.20) as, “the change of electricity load by final customers from their 
normal or current consumption patterns in response to market signals, including in response to 
time-variable electricity prices or incentive payments, or in response to the acceptance of the final 
customer’s bid to sell demand reduction or increase at a price in an organised market as defined in 
point (4) of Article 2 of Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/20141, whether alone 
or through aggregation”. The concept of organised markets is defined in “Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1348/2014” and is very broad. It covers any system in which 
multiple third-parties buying and selling interests in energy products, are able to interact in a way 
that results in a contract. It includes exchanges, brokers and other intermediaries. 
                                               
9 This fourth package is also known as “The Winter Package” or “Clean Energy Package” and was initiated in 2016.  
10 Improving Overall Energy Efficiency remains one of the main goals of the EU climate goals. The Energy Efficiency 
Directive (2018) allows member states to impose Energy Efficiency Obligations on the basis of objective and non-
discriminatory criteria on energy distributors and retail energy sales companies. In 2015, five countries had Energy 
Efficiency Obligations Schemes: Denmark, France, Italy, Poland and the UK. https://www.eceee.org/policy-areas/EE-
directive/energy-efficiency-obligations/. Other member states rely on alternative methods.  
11 In particular, Article 15 imposed a number of requirements. The Energy Efficiency Directive is amended in the Clean 
Energy Package (2018/2002/EU).  
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Important in this definition is that consumers react to market signals and that their response 
reflects short term deviations from normal consumption levels.12 The definition also distinguishes 
implicit demand response, where consumers observe prices and adjust their demand accordingly 
and explicit demand response, where consumers - possibly through intermediaries - bid into 
organised markets and participate directly in the price formation process.  
The Clean Energy Package consists of a new energy rulebook13 covering four directives and four 
regulations. The most relevant for the Internet of Energy are the following:  
 The amending Directive on Energy Efficiency (2018);14 
 The new Electricity Regulation (2019);15  
 The amending Directive on Electricity (2019).16  
The Clean Energy Package brings forth an updated market design for electricity markets and 
introduces new measures regarding dynamic pricing, the market access of demand response, the 
role of aggregators and energy communities and the regulation of TSOs and DSOs.  
Providing consumers with the correct prices  
A first set of measures aims at increasing implicit demand response. To implement this, consumers 
should face dynamic prices, namely time-varying energy prices and transmission tariffs that reflect 
market scarcity and smart metering systems that continuously measure energy consumption by 
individual consumers are required.  
Annex XI of the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU) states that network or retail tariffs may 
support dynamic pricing for demand response measures by final customers, time-of-use tariffs, 
critical peak pricing, real time pricing and peak time rebates. The recast Electricity Directive 
requires that the national regulatory frameworks enable suppliers to offer dynamic electricity price 
contracts, and that Member States ensure that final customers with smart meters installed can 
request to conclude a dynamic electricity price contract. The directive defines dynamic electricity 
price contracts in article 2.15 as “an electricity supply contract between a supplier and a final 
customer that reflects the price variation in the spot markets, including in the day-ahead and 
intraday markets, at intervals at least equal to the market settlement frequency" (Energy Efficiency 
Directive (2012/27/EU). 
Article 19 of the recast Electricity Directive requires Member States (or national regulatory 
authorities) to strongly recommend electricity undertakings and other market participants to 
optimise the use of electricity, inter alia, by providing energy management services, developing 
innovative pricing formulas and introducing smart metering systems that are interoperable, in 
particular with consumer energy management systems and with smart grids […]. Member States 
are required to ensure the implementation of smart metering systems that assist in customer 
                                               
12 In the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012/27EU) the term ‘demand response’ was not yet crystallised and defined as 
“a mechanism to reduce or shift consumption to improve energy efficiency.” 
13 An overview is provided at https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/energy-strategy-and-energy-union/clean-energy-
all-europeans  
14 Directive (EU) 2018/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 amending Directive 
2012/27/EU on energy efficiency (Text with EEA relevance.) PE/54/2018/REV/1. 
15 Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for 
electricity (Text with EEA relevance.) PE/9/2019/REV/1. 
16 Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the 
internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU (Text with EEA relevance.) PE/10/2019/REV/1.  
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participation in their territories, possibly subject to a cost-benefit assessment. A cost-benefit 
assessment should be revaluated at least every four years (preamble, 53).17 
Consumer access, aggregators and energy communities  
A second set of measures focuses on active demand response, where consumers and small 
business can directly participate in energy markets. The principle of market access of consumers 
through aggregation, or individually, was established in the Energy Efficiency Directive (2012) and 
supported by specific measures in the new Electricity Directive, which define the roles of 
aggregators and energy communities.  
Article 15.8 of the (2012) Energy Efficiency Directive had significant relevance with regards to 
explicit demand response: it required Member States to encourage demand side resources (DSR) 
to participate alongside supply in wholesale and retail markets, and to ensure that TSOs and DSOs 
treat demand response providers, including aggregators, without discrimination on the basis of 
their technical capabilities. The article also required Member States to, inter alia, define technical 
modalities for participation in balancing, reserves and other system services markets on the basis 
of the technical requirements of these markets and the capabilities of demand response, including 
the participation of aggregators.  
In article 2.18, the Electricity Directive defines aggregation as “a function performed by a natural 
or legal person who combines multiple customer loads or generated electricity for sale, purchase or 
auction in any electricity market”, while article 2.19 defines an independent aggregator as “a 
market participant engaged in aggregation who is not affiliated to the customer’s supplier”. Article 
17 of the Directive requires Member States to allow final customers, individually or through 
aggregation, to participate alongside producers in all electricity markets, in a non-discriminatory 
manner. Member States are required to ensure that in producing ancillary services, TSOs and DSOs 
treat market participants engaged in the aggregation of demand response in a non-discriminatory 
manner alongside producers on the basis of their technical capabilities.  
Importantly, the national regulatory frameworks are required to provide aggregators with the right 
to enter electricity markets without consent from other market participants, to have non-
discriminatory, transparent rules that assign roles and responsibilities to all electricity undertakings 
and customers and to make rules about data-exchange between market participants and finally, to 
establish a conflict resolution mechanism between market participants.  
In the original proposal, aggregation services would not pay any compensation to other market 
participants, but this is no longer the case in the last version of the text, when other parties are 
directly affected by demand response activation. Member States may require electricity 
undertakings or participating final customers to pay financial compensation to other market 
participants, or to the market participants’ balance responsible parties, if those market participants 
or balance responsible parties are directly affected by demand response activation. Note that 
indirect effects, for instance through targeting specific consumer types, does not require 
compensation. Market participants engaged in aggregation will be financially responsible for the 
imbalances they cause in the electricity system (17.3(d)). However, there is also a requirement for 
a, “provision for final customers who have a contract with independent aggregators not to be 
                                               
17 Art. 20 of the Directive and Annex III determine those minimal standards. Meters should provide accurate 
measurement of actual consumption and self-generation, real-time information should be made available without 
additional cost, and the system should allow metering and settling at the same time resolution as the imbalance 
market.  
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subject to undue payments, penalties or other undue contractual restrictions by their suppliers;” in 
17.3(e).  
Similar requirements to facilitate aggregation of distributed demand and supply are put forward in 
the Electricity Regulation: it states in its principles (article 3(e)) that consumers’ and small 
enterprises’ market participation must be enabled by aggregation of generation or consumption. 
The same Regulation’s article 6.1 indicates that all market participants should have access to 
balancing markets, either individually or through aggregation.  
Note that consumers can participate in all organised energy markets. So, this includes not 
only the day-ahead and the balancing markets, but also the ancillary services markets and capacity 
markets, unless technical limitations prevent it. Organised energy markets also include all 
derivatives products (forward and option markets) and contracts offered by independent brokers. 
In order to participate in these markets, consumers may use an aggregator, but the Directive also 
allows them to participate without such an intermediary. The Directive foresees that aggregators 
may be required to pay financial compensation to other market participants (e.g. retailers) directly 
affected by DR activation.18 This is an important requirement as aggregators may, depending on 
the market design, impose negative externalities on suppliers. Aggregators may, for example, 
“cherry pick” consumers with demand profiles, which are more favourable than the average 
consumer (see section 3 for a more detailed discussion). 
The recast Electricity Directive defines ‘citizen energy communities’ in article 2.11 as a legal 
entity based on open, voluntary participation and controlled by members or shareholders who are 
natural persons or local authorities. A citizen energy community’s primary purpose is providing 
environmental, economic or social benefits to the members or shareholders of the community, or 
to the local area where it operates. This community may engage in generation. Member states may 
grant citizen energy communities the right to manage distribution networks in their area of 
operation and establish the relevant procedures. (Art. 16.4).19  
Article 16.3 of the Directive obliges Member States to ensure that citizen energy communities can 
access all electricity markets, are treated in a non-discriminatory manner, are financially 
responsible for the imbalances they cause in the electricity system and that they are treated like 
active customers in accordance with article 15.2(e). According to article 16 of the Directive, 
Member States are required to set a legal framework that ensures that participation in these 
communities is voluntary, protects the shareholders’ rights and ensures that shareholders, or 
members, are allowed to leave such a community.  
If a citizen energy community manages a distribution network, then they are entitled to make 
agreements with the relevant DSO or TSO to which their network is connected. The community 
then has to pay appropriate network charges at the connection points between their network and 
the distribution network outside the community. It is upon Member States to determine how those 
network charges will be determined in practice. The same article (16.4(d)) requires that customers 
                                               
18 The Directive limits those compensations, as they should not limit market entry or flexibility (Art. 17.4). 
19 The Renewable Energy Directive Art 2(16) defines a slightly narrower concept: a ‘renewable energy community’. As 
the citizen energy communities, it is a legal entity with open and voluntary cooperation, effectively controlled by 
members or shareholders (natural persons, SMEs or local authorities) and which primary purpose is not financial profits 
but rather environmental, economic or social community benefits. Renewable energy communities have to be located 
in the proximity of the renewable energy projects that are owned and developed by the legal entity, and the renewable 
energy community can produce, consume, store and sell renewable energy, share renewable energy within the 
community and access all suitable markets.  
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connected to the distribution network operated by a community shall not be harmed or 
discriminated against.  
Hence, citizen energy communities could in some member states fulfil the (partial) role of DSOs 
and of a supplier. In order to become a citizen energy community, the community needs to be 
controlled by natural persons or local authorities. It does not necessarily have to participate in 
distributed generation and it can generate environmental, economic or social benefits to the 
community or the area in which it operates. Note that there are no explicit requirements for 
members to be physically close to each other - however the scope of the community has to be 
local. For-profit communities are not strictly ruled out and neither are private companies with 
minority shareholders in the community. Although communities are allowed to manage the 
distribution network, network ownership is not covered under the definition.  
Increased role of DSOs 
The Clean Energy Package also adapts regulation in recognition of the larger role that DSOs are 
expected to play in the future.  
According to article 52 of the new Electricity Regulation, DSOs shall cooperate through a European 
Entity for DSOs - “EU DSO entity” - in order to promote the completion and functioning of the 
internal market in electricity and optimal management and a coordinated cooperation of DSOs and 
TSOs. DSOs who wish to participate shall become registered members of the entity. Article 55 
describes the tasks of the EU DSO, which are quite extensive: from coordinating operation and 
planning of transmission and distribution networks, facilitation of integration of renewable energy 
resources and distributed generation and direct and indirect demand response, to digitalisation of 
distribution networks (smart grids and smart meters), cyber security and data management. 
According to the preface of the Regulation, DSOs may require regulatory safeguards to ensure 
neutrality in their functions, since they may often be vertically integrated companies that are also 
involved in supply or other services. The Regulation states that the EU DSO is needed to improve 
the efficiency of the electricity distribution networks within the EU and to ensure cooperation with 
TSOs and the European Network of Transmission Systems Operators (ENTSO) for Electricity. 
Article 57 of the Electricity Regulation requires DSOs and TSOs to cooperate in planning and 
operating their networks, in particular exchanging information and data, and they must cooperate 
to achieve coordinated access to resources such as demand response. Article 28 of the same 
regulation requires TSOs to cooperate through ENTSO for Electricity at Union level. Article 30 
obliges TSOs to establish regional cooperation within the ENTSO for Electricity and specifies that 
the regional coordination centres shall complement the role of TSOs.  
The recast Electricity Directive affirms the larger set of tasks of DSOs in chapter IV. Article 32 of 
the Directive obliges Member States to provide the legal framework required to allow and 
incentivise DSOs to procure services in order to improve efficiency in the distribution system. The 
same article requires regulatory frameworks in Member States to enable DSOs to procure services 
from resources such as demand response in transparent, non-discriminatory manners. DSOs are 
required to define standardised market products of the services acquired in ensuring effective 
participation of all market participants, including demand response. Distribution system operators 
shall cooperate with TSOs for the effective participation of market participants connected to their 
grid in retail, wholesale and balancing markets according to article 31.9.  
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Box1: The status of demand response regulation EU markets before the Clean Energy 
Package 
One the goals of the Energy Package is to improve demand response in EU markets. Although 
demand response was already foreseen in the Energy Efficiency Directive in 2012, this was not yet 
operational in many countries as seen in the studies by SEDC (2017) and JRC (2016). 
SEDC (2017) reviews the status of demand response in 18 countries in 2017. It concludes that 
most markets are open to demand response, but regulatory barriers hampered growth in a 
number of countries (e.g. requirements that are unadjusted to enable demand-side participation), 
in almost all countries, had problems with measurement, verification and payment schemes 
(transparency, multiple baseline methodologies, measurement of energy consumption)  
The European Commission’s Joint Research Centre’s (JRC, 2016) confirms those results. It 
highlights that in several countries independent aggregators cannot offer demand side resources, 
(no means to measure or pay for those resources, and markets that are closed.)  
Since 2017, member states have worked hard on removing barriers for distributed energy 
resources, but full market access has not been achieved.20 
 
  
                                               
20 For instance, in Italy some recent initiatives are opening new opportunities for DR in the Ancillary Services, see: 
https://lightbox.terna.it/en/distributed-resources-UVAM. In the Capacity market, a new scheme has been approved for 
DG and demand units will be allowed to participate. SmartEN (2018) describes the situation for the balancing markets. 
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2. From conventional to smart consumers 
In this section, we focus on what drives consumer behaviour in electricity markets. The quest to 
find the drivers of consumer behaviour in electricity markets is of interest for both researchers and 
policymakers. The consumers’ role is changing, from simple price-takers, more and more of them 
are now actively participating in the market through demand side management and micro-
generation. At the same time, preferences for clean energy may transform customer willingness to 
pay and their perception of electricity as a homogenous good. However, the experience of 
liberalised retail markets shows the importance of inertia in customer behaviour that may prevent 
the afore-mentioned trends from materialising. 
2.1. The different consumers 
There are different types of demand (and hence consumers) that can be summarised in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Consumer types based on available technology 
 
Source: adapted from Kubli et al., 2018 
Additionally, smart consumers are part of energy communities. An energy community – as we have 
discussed above – can be a group of households or industrial consumers from a well-defined 
geographical area (e.g. building, apartment blocks, technology hub…) that agree to jointly invest in 
photovoltaic panels or a wind turbine. Each member of the energy community has to contribute to 
the investment of the common power installation and not of a particular energy production unit.21 
                                               
21 See section 1.2 for the “legal” definition of an energy community in the EU. 
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Note that energy production in excess will be sold outside the energy community. The surplus is re-
injected in the public grid and compensated, depending on the country, at feed-in tariffs or the 
hourly price realised in markets (e.g. net billing schemes).22 
To conclude, households/industrial consumers may be attracted by financial incentives to gather in 
energy communities, but the incentives should be in line with the complexity of creating viable 
communities. There is a need for regulation that provides guidelines to define and monitor energy 
communities by specifying their roles, rights and responsibilities.  
2.2. The key drivers of electricity consumption 
There is a large body of literature discussing the factors that affect electricity demand. Many 
drivers have been proven to affect electricity consumption: price, available information, switching 
and search costs, social norms, or even individual preferences for green energy. We briefly discuss 
these different factors in the following subsections.23 
Price as the right signal 
Electricity fulfils the law of demand in that higher prices lead to a reduction in demand even though 
the degree of elasticity varies between different type of consumers. Field experiments showing a 
negative price elasticity of electricity demand go back to Battalio et al. (1979) and Caves and 
Christensen (1980), who estimated that rebates and real time pricing can lower electricity demand 
as well as peak shifting. While these early studies had small sample sizes, their findings have 
generally been confirmed by more recent studies with larger sample size (e.g. Faruqui and George, 
2005), or focusing on markets outside of the United States (e.g. Japan in Ito, Ida and Tanaka, 
2018).  
Switching costs and loss-aversion 
The liberalisation of the retail market for electricity that took place in many countries around the 
year 2000 offers various insights into the behaviour of customers in power markets. Defeuilley 
(2009) examines this first wave of liberalisation and argues that the reforms did not allow for 
efficient markets due to switching costs.24 Indeed, Sweden, Great Britain and Norway were – at 
that point – the only countries with switching rates above 25%. Even in these countries there were 
large price differences between incumbents and new entrants, suggesting that there was an active 
market of consumers reacting to price signals) and a larger inactive market of consumers 
remaining loyal to the incumbent. Yang (2014) analyses the low probability of Danish customers 
switching to a new electricity retailer, despite the liberalisation of the retail market and switching 
being relatively easy. He finds that relationship management is the main driver in changing 
electricity retailer, while economic benefits and psychological attachment have little power. He also 
mentions the role of a regulated and relatively cheap default tariffs.  
The low switching rates in retail contracts may also be the result of behavioural bias such as loss-
aversion. Indeed, Nicolson et al. (2017) conducted an experiment with a representative sample of 
British energy bill payers to determine the viability of introducing time of use tariffs. They found 
that while more than a third of the surveyed customers were willing to switch to time of use tariffs, 
the actual switching rates were negatively affected by loss aversion. That is, customers, when 
                                               
22 Note that for small projects “net metering” might be more profitable than a FiT in most countries. See Status of 
support schemes in Europe: https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/-/-/80ff3127-8328-52c3-4d01-0acbdb2d3bed  
23 A thorough summary of part of this literature can be found in the review article by Hahn and Metcalfe (2016). 
24 Switching costs consist of search costs (i.e. identifying and comparing suppliers), learning costs (i.e. developing 
relations with the new supplier) and transaction costs (i.e. negotiating and contracting with the new supplier). 
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deciding to switch suppliers or contract type, care more about potential losses than potential 
benefits. Mulder and Willems (2019) found mixed results for the Netherlands. Yearly switching 
rates (15% per year) and product innovation in particular in green electricity was relatively high 
(50 green products and 20 grey products are offered by the seven main retailers) and consumers 
were willing to pay a premium for green energy. However, a large fraction of dormant consumers 
never switched (40% of the market).  
The impact of available information 
Information about residential electricity consumption often leads to a reduction in electricity 
demand. Gans, Alberini and Longo (2013) found that providing households with meters that 
allowed them to track their consumption in real-time reduced usage significantly. In another study, 
Schwartz et al. (2013) showed that households reduced their consumption after being notified that 
their electricity consumption was being monitored even though they did not receive any 
instructions to reduce their usage. Similarly, Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) found that informing 
consumers about the cost and efficiency benefits of energy-efficient lightbulbs increased the 
purchase of these types of lightbulbs. Meanwhile, a later study by Allcott and Sweeney (2017) 
found that providing information on efficiency alone did not increase the purchase of energy 
efficient water heaters while a combination of price incentives and information increased the 
market share of these heaters. A recent field experiment by Bollinger and Hartmann (2017) found 
that information treatments alone are successful in reducing long term demand, but only in 
combination with automation technology do they lead to changes in short-term elasticity.25 
Social Comparison 
Using social norms in combination with information about one’s own energy use can lead to a 
reduction in electricity usage. In a large experiment Allcott (2011) found that sending home energy 
reports which compare customers’ consumption to that of their neighbours could reduce energy 
consumption by an average of two percent. Similar results were reported by Ayres et al. (2013) 
who found that home energy reports decrease electricity consumption in a sustained way. 
According to Herberich et al. (2011) price and social norms affect the decision to invest in energy 
efficient technology (in their case: efficient light bulbs): the price affects how many light bulbs are 
bought, while social norms affect the decision to purchase any efficient light bulbs at all. However, 
Dolan and Metcalfe (2015) found that while social norms and pricing are both effective in reducing 
consumption on their own, the combination of both eliminates the effect. Likewise, the study by 
LaRiviere et al. (2014) showed that the framing of energy reports matter to their effect: people 
reduce their consumption when the social goods component of their actions is stressed. Lastly, Ito, 
Ida and Tanaka (2018) argue that moral incentives only reduce energy consumption in the short 
run but have no long-term effect. 
Preference for green energy  
Consumers generally exhibit a willingness to pay higher prices for electricity produced by green and 
renewable forms of generation. There is a large body of literature estimating this willingness to pay 
in a variety of settings. Based on these studies, Sundt and Rehdanz (2015) conducted a meta-
regression analysis of the existing literature. They found that the willingness to pay for renewable 
energy differs by source with hydro-power being the least valued. Furthermore, people with 
information about the type of power plants substituted by renewables exhibited a higher 
willingness to pay. In the descriptive part of their paper, the authors further argue that the 
                                               
25 Note that Jessoe and Rapson (2014) find that price incentives alone lead to a lower reduction in electricity use than 
when the same price incentives are combined with an information treatment. 
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willingness to pay is higher in settings where consumers are richer, younger, have lower current 
electricity prices and are more concerned with environmental issues. Similarly, Grilli et al. (2017) 
conducted a meta-analysis which revealed that the share of renewables, current level of CO2 
emissions and the replaced energy source affected the willingness to pay for green electricity. 
Meanwhile, Ma et al. (2017) found in a similar study that the differences in their meta-regression 
analysis were driven by differences in experimental design rather than true factors affecting the 
willingness to pay. In addition, consumers’ preferences for greener solutions often translated into 
(1) ‘a feel good decision’ of changing the service provision to consume green energy or (2) taking 
the active decision of investing in renewables or being part of energy communities.  
Offer flexibility services 
In a modern-day electricity system, there is an interest in incentivising prosumers to offer flexibility 
to the grid, in order to adjust to the higher volatility in supply that arises from the increased 
reliance on intermittent generation. Bollinger and Hartmann (2017) showed that pricing signals 
combined with automation in end-use systems have the potential to create a short-term elasticity 
of electricity demand.  
In a recent experimental study, Kubli et al. (2018) worked with owners of PV plus storage, electric 
vehicles (EV) and heat pumps. They investigated their willingness to participate in flexibility 
programmes that would allow the utility to access their devices. They conclude that there is 
generally a significant potential for participation. However, they also found that owners of heat 
pumps are less willing to participate in these programmes than the other two groups. Additionally, 
they found that EV owners were unwilling to participate in a programme that allows their charging 
level to drop too much. Other studies show that EV owners (see Parsons et al. (2014)) or 
residential consumers (see Richter and Pollitt (2018)) might need to be compensated substantially 
to participate in smart energy markets. However, the full potential of electric vehicles and their role 
in providing flexibility to the grid (i.e. as storage) is not currently exploited. The vehicle owner 
would not only need to connect the vehicle into the grid even while not charging, which may result 
in additional payments, but also would need to have agreements with aggregators or other market 
participants for the use of batteries (CERRE, 2019b). 
It is also possible that consumers were reluctant to sign up for demand response as they 
underestimated the individual and societal advantages and that they requested a relatively high 
financial incentive to participate. Interestingly, Roth et al. (2018) compared households that co-
own distributed generation with those that do not and found some evidence that households that 
sell electricity to the grid are more willing to participate in demand response programmes. They 
argued that this was due to the financial incentives for efficient consumption that selling excess 
electricity provided. Another barrier to the participation in demand response could be distrust in 
the energy company, as argued by Stenner et al. (2017). 
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3. Business models and market participants 
The emergence of decentralised energy systems and the increased penetration of distributed non-
dispatchable technologies has created new business opportunities for existing and new market 
players in the energy sector. These include traditional energy retailers, prosumers, aggregators, 
energy services companies and citizen energy communities. New and existing players are starting 
to operate in different markets across the energy system and across time, although an organised 
market for flexibility is not clearly defined or established yet. Such an organised market would 
facilitate flexibility through different and potentially competing services, such as storage, demand 
side response, virtual power plants and ancillary services, at different times and under different 
system conditions (e.g. see Brunekreeft et al. 2016).  
Some flexible services could evolve by subscription (i.e. to ‘energy/heat as a service’ model). 
Digitisation may give rise to new product service models where the user ‘rents or pays per use’ for 
a device including maintenance and support and eventually including a lump sum for its 
consumption. Other services such as renewable power, heating and EV charging could emerge, 
purchased in a bundle or in part from commercial housing companies, for example when renting an 
apartment or from energy services companies (ESCOs).26  
Among the participants in the markets for flexible generation and demand response we will 
consider aggregators, trading platforms, microgrids and citizen energy communities, in an attempt 
to identify their business models and the regulatory challenges that their activities are likely to 
generate. Despite decentralisation, during the transition to a decarbonised system, some 
centralised technologies will remain relevant to ensuring security of supply and affordability. For 
this reason, better integration between energy markets at different scales will be required in the 
short-to-medium term. 
Much attention has focussed on the emergence of independent aggregators as economic agents, 
providing consumers with access to energy markets. In order to provide these services, they will 
need to coordinate production and consumption decisions made by a large number of individual 
consumers or prosumers. Retailers and independent aggregators carry out similar functions: they 
schedule power procurement or production, balance market positions, settle market transactions 
and bill customers for their services. Indeed, traditional retailers across the United States and 
Europe are starting to offer DER aggregation services. Generally, these services are offered mainly 
to industrial and commercial consumers with fewer examples of engagement with residential 
consumers and prosumers. 
Three main models have been identified to help integrate prosumers into the grid: prosumer-to-
grid (including aggregation), peer-to-peer trading (via trading platforms and in microgrids) and 
prosumer community group or citizen energy communities (Hirsch et al., 2018). According to 
Stadler et al. (2016), the main value streams, targeted by private microgrids and energy 
communities, include demand response, power export and net metering, resiliency and local 
energy markets. 
In the electricity sector, recovery of legacy network cost has become a pressing issue, especially 
given the emergence of DER, whose generation is organised at the local level in microgrids and/or 
                                               
26 For a discussion of recent developments for ECOs see: https://www.iea.org/topics/energyefficiency/escos and 
http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC106624/kjna28716enn.pdf 
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energy communities. To address concerns around the potential impact on the most vulnerable 
members of society, whose consumption is dependent on the existing centralised system and may 
end up paying a disproportionate amount of network costs, existing forms of subsidy for RES such 
as net metering and network-use charging (fixed Vs variable, energy Vs capacity charges, etc. 
which will be discussed in section 5.1), need to be reconsidered (Gautier, 2018; Schittekatte et al., 
2018; Bennato et al., 2019). Further distributional concerns relate to the potential financial 
implications for poorer consumers (who are dependent on existing, traditional infrastructure) as a 
result of investment carried out by wealthier communities, which allows them to achieve energy 
efficiency and lower costs, but might generate local congestion problems or indirectly increase the 
financial burden on the rest of the local residents. These issues will be discussed in more detail in 
section 3.5 below. 
3.1. Retailing and aggregation 
As discussed in section 1.2, when considering emerging business models in the energy space, a 
distinction between aggregators and retailers may not be required, as aggregation can be seen as 
a function carried out both by traditional/incumbent suppliers and by emerging companies adopting 
more innovative business models. However, the more specific concept of independent 
aggregators27 is likely to apply to those emerging actors in the energy services space that are able 
to aggregate demand and generation across different users, independently from established 
suppliers.  
The prevailing business models for flexibility delivered by consumers or buildings are demand 
response (DR) and virtual power plants (VPP) including generation units, storage and ICT systems. 
While implicit demand response can be delivered via retailers through dynamic pricing, explicit 
demand response and access to energy markets for virtual power plants requires some form of 
aggregation.  
Ma et al. (2017) highlighted the importance of incentive programmes, national regulation and 
market structure in promoting participation in the flexibility market by prosumers (including 
buildings). They considered the case study of Nordic countries, where DR participation was open to 
small consumers (in most cases this is implicit participation via price-based programmes e.g. Time 
of Use tariffs as part of a retailers’ supply contract), while only large consumers can access the 
wholesale market. According to their analysis, under the current regulatory system, the highest 
value to the aggregation market would come from implicit DR programmes run by retailers. 
However, they noted that the provision of DR services by consumers in Nordic countries could 
come via aggregators or VPP business models, in the presence of a regulatory framework. This 
would create incentives to help TSOs/DSOs to encourage consumers to participate in the 
DR/aggregation market, with clearly defined monetary benefits and financial support aimed at 
promoting technology adoption. However, if promoting automatic DR system is thought to be the 
most efficient way to provide flexibility to the system, then issues of privacy and public acceptance 
will need to be addressed.  
Hall and Roelich (2016) discuss the challenges faced by aggregators and energy services providers 
more generally in the context of the UK market, by highlighting the substantial risks associated 
with the provision of flexibility services in terms of being appropriately compensated for the value 
provided to the system. They pointed out that there was still uncertainty about the monetary value 
                                               
27 According to Art. 19 an independent aggregator is ‘a market participant engaged in aggregation who is not affiliated 
to the customer's supplier’. 
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of these services to final (residential) consumers, in the presence of high contracting costs in this 
relatively underdeveloped market.  
A recent example of an aggregator in the UK is Open Energi, which operates as a VPP (Dynamic 
Demand 2.0) involving mainly industrial and commercial consumers.28 They rely on a platform that 
connects, controls and aggregates distributed energy resources such as on-site generation and 
energy storage systems in an automated process. This allows them to support their customers in 
accessing balancing markets, such as firm frequency response or renewables balancing reserve and 
in undertaking automated trading, based on day-ahead, intra-day and real time pricing. This broad 
range of activities is facilitated by a regulatory framework that allows and promotes DR and 
independent aggregators’ activity. 
For most energy consumers, retailers have responsibility for aggregating their load, procuring and 
scheduling consumption and production. Retail tariffs are the main investment and operation signal 
for distributed energy resources. While there is some evidence, as discussed in section 2, that 
consumers adjust their consumption in reaction to short term changes in prices, Burger et al. 
(2019) identified some potential barriers to participation, such as the existence of transaction 
costs, limited attention and risk aversion for retail consumers. For these reasons, new entities, 
such as aggregators, may need to offer contracts, hedging strategies and demand management to 
attract residential consumers.  
The emergence of independent aggregators and other new entrants into the market is likely to 
stimulate competition, as they can offer attractive contracts to the most flexible 
consumers/prosumers, whose load can be profitably used to exploit arbitrage opportunities in the 
wholesale market, or in the ancillary services market. This will create system externalities requiring 
some form of compensation by aggregators to other retailers. The issue of compensation for the 
externalities generated in the system as a result of market participation, which involves 
withdrawals and input of energy into the system, raises questions about the correct assessment of 
the level of costs imposed on retailers, as a result of such market activities. While the wholesale 
market price could be considered as the correct opportunity cost, as it reflects the cost of procuring 
electricity for the average retail consumer, the loss of retail consumers with the most profitable 
profiles might be associated with more substantial revenue losses for traditional retailers.29 The 
current EU regulation however does not require consumers to seek the permission of retailers 
before entering into contract with aggregators for the provision of DR. The motivation for this is 
likely to be related to the objective of promoting new entry into the retail market and of increasing 
competition across suppliers. Indeed, it is expected that technological innovation and changes in 
rates may increase the potential for competition at the retail level, creating value via differentiated 
products and services. While consumers do not need their retailers’ permission to engage with new 
entrants in the current regulation, there is however a requirement that independent aggregators 
compensate other parties for the direct effects of demand response activation on other market 
participants.  
Burger et al. (2019) also noted that a variety of arrangements in the US and EU mean that DNOs 
and DSOs can, in some cases, compete with retailers. In some jurisdictions DNOs might share 
                                               
28 See: https://www.openenergi.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/open-energi-dynamic-demand-2-0-service-
overview.pdf 
29 In order to prevent such cherry picking, the compensation scheme should not correct for the average consumer 
profile, but for the consumer profile of the particular market segment that consumers belongs to. If such compensation 
scheme is not present, then retailers may be forced to use real time prices to prevent cherry picking, but might hollow 
out the function of retailers as insurance providers.  
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asset ownership with (partially) unbundled competitive affiliates, but the authors state that where 
distribution has been unbundled from retailing, regulators must ensure DNO/SO neutrality by 
keeping DSOs’ ownership separate from retailers/aggregators.  
3.2. Microgrids and trading platforms 
The Internet of energy is understood to be a network of connected devices allowing the efficient 
management of the energy system by collecting, analysing, monitoring and exploiting real-time 
data (Zhou et al., 2016). In this complex, connected energy system several actors and 
technologies are involved including prosumers, aggregators, microgrids and trading platforms, 
which can all be based on blockchain technology.  
The Microgrid Exchange Group developed the following microgrid definition:  
‘[…] a group of interconnected loads and DER within clearly defined electrical boundaries that 
acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid ... A microgrid can connect and 
disconnect to the grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected and island mode’ (Ton 
and Smith, 2012).  
When security of supply is an issue microgrids are preferred to virtual power plants as they can 
operate island mode (Hirsch et al., 2018). According to Mengelkamp et al. (2017), ‘microgrid 
energy markets allow small-scale participants, such as prosumers and consumers, to actively trade 
energy within their community in (near) real time’.  
Microgrids facilitate the sharing of renewable resources and allow for better utilisation of generation 
and load resources. For this reason they are expected to generate lower energy consumption costs, 
once established and integrated into the system. However, microgrids differ in their institutional 
features (e.g. industrial and commercial, community, military etc.) and in the range of assets and 
ITC systems they rely on, so they adopt different business models and target different revenue 
streams. Central to the financial viability of the microgrid and the success of its business model is 
the control platform (Asmus and MacKinnon, 2016), as will be discussed in section 3.4.  
The emergence of microgrids in the energy systems of different countries raises both legal and 
regulatory issues regarding how these new entities should be treated in comparison with existing 
market players. The regulation of microgrids will have to deal with two key issues: 1) should they 
be considered as distribution companies and subject to regulation? 2) how will they fit in the 
existing legal system? (Hirsch et al., 2018). From a regulatory point of view, microgrids are likely 
to be considered as utilities serving a variety of customers and may therefore be subject to 
regulation on tariffs and capital investment. They may also be obliged to comply with consumer 
protection law. Hirsch et al. (2018) suggested that their vertically-integrated nature may be 
problematic in deregulated and unbundled markets. Another potential social welfare issue relating 
to the emergence of independent microgrids is the problem of fewer consumers having to pay for 
infrastructure costs, but this problem might be overcome by a ‘pay for performance’ renumeration 
system for traditional utilities. Traditional utilities in US are starting to see microgrids as a way of 
offering new services to their customers and in increasing reliability. 
Two Scottish islands in the UK have created microgrids that rely on local power from RES. In order 
to achieve a sustainable energy system, the Isles of Eigg and Gigha have invested in large-scale 
renewables and battery capacity. In order to supply total energy demand, Eigg has adopted a 
diverse set of smaller renewable technologies such as hydroelectric (112kW), wind turbines (24kW) 
and a solar array (50kW). Gigha meanwhile, has invested in four relatively large-scale wind 
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turbines (4MW). Realising the grid constraints following installation of the fourth wind turbine, 
Gigha reinforced their systems with battery technologies. Both isles have installed batteries to 
support and manage system demand, with a host of 48V lead acid batteries introduced in Eigg and 
a 1.68MWh vanadium redox flow battery in Gigha. in addition to alleviating grid congestion, Gigha’s 
battery is expected to provide several key services such as backup supply, flexibility and voltage 
control). The two island communities have so far benefitted from either decreased electricity bills 
(Eigg) or increased income generated from greater utilisation of local generation and ancillary 
services (Gigha).30 
An innovative partnership is pushing the boundaries of this business model through the realisation 
of “smart energy islands”. The European Regional Development Fund have provided Hitachi, Moixa 
and PassivSystems with £10.8m to co-finance the bringing together and management of renewable 
and low-carbon technologies using IoT (Smart Energy Islands, 2019). The project aims to deliver a 
framework for sustainable islands, which can also be replicated in rural regions, through the 
integration and optimisation of renewables via an IoT platform (Hitachi), smart batteries (Moixa)31 
and demand-side management hubs (PassivSystems). The project will be developed on the Isle of 
Scilly, a region that suffers from expensive energy bills and high rates of fuel poverty. These issues 
are, in part, tackled through the increased level of self-consumption of domestic solar. Noting that 
this electricity is paid for at a subsidised rate, the 10 households with solar panels on the roofs of 
their homes continue to contribute to local infrastructure. What is more, the regional and licensed 
energy supplier, the Isle of Scilly Community Venture, has created a local energy tariff to ensure 
that the financial benefits of local electricity consumption are shared as part of the community 
development project. Transport has also part subsidised through the introduction of 25 charge 
points, supported by 10 solar arrays, in order to provide fuel for 10 communal electric vehicles. 
The project aims, by 2050, for a 40% reduction in energy consumption, a 40% increase in local 
renewable generation and a 40% switch to electric vehicles. 
Ahl et al. (2019) pointed out that expectations have been set on the ability of P2P microgrids, 
possibly blockchain-based, to deliver value both to consumers and to the energy system. However 
the technological innovations supporting these new market organisations require appropriate 
changes in the institutional and regulatory framework that currently supports the energy system. 
They subscribe to Mengelkamp et al.’s (2017) view that the lack of appropriate regulation 
represents a key challenge for the development of local energy markets. Similarly, Wu and Tran 
(2018) ed the significant development potential in the application of blockchain in a decentralised 
energy sector, but also discuss the existing limitations in terms of a lack of suitable regulatory 
guidance for this technology, in addition to technical and skills challenges.  
One example of these regulatory limitations is the absence of clear guidelines on the participation 
of microgrids in markets for ancillary services. Institutional factors play an important role in this 
context as the financial benefits of participating in a microgrid with P2P depend on available 
alternative opportunities, such as feed-in-tariffs (FiT) or net metering arrangements. This was an 
important factor in delaying the development of P2P trading in the Brooklyn microgrid, one of our 
case studies in section 3.4. Additional regulatory issues include clarification on acceptable 
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ownership and partnership models, as well as licensing requirements to trade energy and 
renewable certificates legally (Ahl et al., 2019). 
Blockchain technology is considered suitable to support the development of P2P trading schemes 
(NERA, 2018a). Blockchain-based platforms can help to reduce congestion on the network, and 
they can create financial opportunities for small scale renewables. In the energy sector this 
technology could also eliminate the need for wholesale-to-retail intermediaries and facilitate 
switching suppliers, using platforms that will allow new entrants to act as competitive suppliers.  
The electricity market may be one of the most immediate use cases for blockchain technology. 
Electricity markets, where sales and purchases are cleared in aggregate on centralised trading 
platforms, are similar to financial markets where blockchain technology is currently used. One of 
the main features of blockchain based systems is the absence of a central marketplace where all 
trade takes place, instead there is a chain of trades which need to be tracked. In electricity there is 
an entity in place that keeps records (for technical reasons), and which is regulated (to prevent 
rent extraction)32.  
This technology allows for a decentralised network of prosumers, trading electricity with reduced 
institutional oversight that could, in theory, be organised without a utility (Livingston et al., 2018). 
A system of P2P transactions has been developed by two Austrian companies Verbund and 
Salzburg AG allowing tenants to exchange shares of electricity generated from their roof through 
an app. The Dutch project Jouliette is a blockchain-supported showcase microgrid that was 
developed as a collaboration between a sustainable office park, a DSO and an energy solution 
developer (NERA, 2018a). This is discussed as one of our case studies in section 3.4.  
An example of a new retail supplier, which aims to offer more choice and transparency to final 
consumers, is the Grid+ platform in Texas. It claims it can provide lower variable costs as billing 
and settlement become automated and efficient. Customers pay for their electricity in real-time by 
using the cryptocurrency stored on their Smart Agent. In the short term there will also be lower 
marketing expenses. In the long term, Grid+ hopes to support P2P electricity trading, allowing 
energy to be traded locally. Indeed, the majority of electricity-related blockchain projects involve 
P2P schemes, with some examples discussed in section 3.4. However, it is important to point out 
that cryptocurrencies are subject to extreme fluctuations in value and are therefore are not yet a 
very effective means of payment 
Pilot blockchain-based projects aiming to deliver flexibility services include TenneT, based in the 
Netherlands and Germany, and the UK’s Flexibility marketplace, based on the demand response 
Electron platform. The TenneT project provides flexibility services to the grid by relying on storage 
from either EVs or residential storage systems, namely batteries linked to solar PV generation. A 
consortium of partners including retailers, DNOs and aggregators is seeking to commercialise the 
platform (NERA, 2018a). Electron is a DR platform offering a marketplace for assets to respond to 
pricing signals. It consists of a shared Meter Registration Platform for all UK gas and electricity 
supply points that facilitates faster switching and a flexibility trading platform - a common trading 
venue for all DR action.  
Blockchain is also considered a tool to organise grid transactions as well as reducing costs. 
Additionally, a centralised electricity market, based on blockchain technology, could handle an 
increased number of transactions thereby enabling prosumers and households to participate in the 
                                               
32 For further details on the economic features of blockchain based systems, see: 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25407 
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market. For example, Germany’s Enerchain (enerchain.proton.de) seeks to reduce the costs of 
wholesale trading through a decentralised order book that can be accessed by other traders 
(Livingston et al., 2018).  
Finally, utilities could use blockchain in a variety of ways to simplify their operations, including 
transparency, billing or automation purposes (Andoni et al., 2019). This may also allow for more 
switching behaviour as assets are currently managed through disconnected databases belonging to 
each individual company. Blockchain would allow the connected recoding of transactions such as 
tests, asset movement, asset changes and asset payment (World Energy Council, 2018). For 
example, US energy retailer, Drift is developing a blockchain-based platform that will enable it to 
act like a competitive energy supplier in deregulated markets. Drift leverages distributed ledger 
technology, machine learning and high-frequency trading to directly link independent power 
generators with residents and small and medium-sized enterprises (NERA, 2018a). Another 
example is Grid+ which is developing an automated, Ethereum-based platform that will serve as a 
retailer in deregulated energy markets. By automating billing and settlement, Grid+ aims to 
provide customers with “nearly frictionless access to the wholesale market.” (NERA, 2018a) 
Given all these applications, it is not entirely surprising that there has been a lot of recent activity 
regarding the intersection of blockchain and energy – despite its uncertain future. By March 2018, 
there were already 122 energy sector organisations involved in blockchain technology, and 40 
publicly-announced deployed projects. The total investment in blockchain-based energy projects 
between April 2017 and March 2018 was €240m (NERA, 2018a). Between March 2017 and March 
2018, start-ups raised over $300m for ventures applying the technology in an energy market 
setting. At the same time many traditional energy companies, both in the electricity (e.g., E.On, 
Tokyo Electric Power Company) and oil and gas (e.g. Shell, Statoil) industry, are investing in 
blockchain technology (Livingston et al., 2018).33 
Figure 5: Current use of blockchain in electricity markets 
 
 Source: Andoni et al., 2019, p. 156 
 
                                               
33 For an overview of start-ups and other companies using Blockchain see the Appendix of Livingston et al., 2019, and 
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There are however some barriers to the adoption of blockchain in electricity markets. First, the 
existing grid and system provides reliability and monetary benefits that prevent the switch to a 
pure P2P network (Livingston et al., 2018). Specifically, the existence of economies of scope and 
scale may persist even after blockchain is introduced, so remaining beneficial to maintaining the 
existing market structure, even though small independent communities might arise (NERA, 2018a). 
Also, a P2P market is dependent on residential customers becoming prosumers. However, previous 
experience in giving residential customers a choice with regard to their electricity provider has 
shown that 60% of customers remain with their default provider despite financial incentives (World 
Energy Council, 2018).  
The key limitations of blockchain technology, in energy applications, have been identified as the 
low number of transactions per second, as well as the lack of scaled commercial applications, 
potential security risks and the still limited, public acceptance. However, methods to improve the 
technology are active and ongoing (NERA, 2018b). 
3.3. Community energy  
The movement towards more decentralised energy systems has been driven, in part, by the rapid 
technological change in small-scale energy generation and storage and the more effective 
exploitation of ICT. This technological change has allowed new business models and new economic 
players to emerge, including citizens’ energy communities. The implications of this economic and 
social activity are currently not fully understood, and such entities are monitored, supported and 
regulated in different ways within existing regulatory frameworks. 
Energy communities represent an important new player in the context of decentralised energy 
systems, as organisations that invest in, maintain and operate local energy systems. They can 
participate in the local energy market and can provide support to the distribution and transmission 
networks through the provision of ancillary services. In different countries and in the scientific 
community, different definitions of ‘community energy’ are accepted, reflecting the variety of 
energy-related projects and activities undertaken by local communities with different levels of 
Government support (Brummer, 2018).  
Brummer (2018) reviews the experience of energy communities in Germany, the UK and the US 
identifying the main benefits they bring for the local and national economy, as well as any barriers 
to the development and growth of community energy (CE). Among the key benefits of CE, the 
authors highlight the creation of new social capital, the strengthening of community links and 
facilitating public acceptance of new renewable technologies. The evidence from those countries 
surveyed by Brummer indicates that the inability to achieve an efficient size for the activities and 
assets, limits the ability to produce sufficient surplus to cover the project’s costs. Also, in the UK, 
access to initial funding represents significant challenge for the establishment of energy 
communities. Individual and community-wide financial benefits are recognised as crucial for the 
feasibility and resilience of CE. A minimum size of generation assets can also be a significant 
barrier to access to a supplier licence, which might be needed in order to supply energy to 
community members, but on the other hand a large generation capacity could limit the CE’s ability 
to participate in Government support schemes, such as the UK’s FiT. Finally, CE development can 
be hindered by complex legal processes and ineffective, and often uncertain, support schemes. In 
the UK and Germany, the lack of market access is highlighted as a key barrier to the financial 
viability of CE, as a result of market structures that are biased in favour of big companies with 
centralised generation. High connection costs to the distribution network are also a significant 
challenge for CE. The current limitations of CE and potential solutions will be discussed further, as 
part of the lessons learned from the emerging experiences, in section 3.5. 
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Koirala et al. (2018) investigate the specific area of CE storage, highlighting the role played by this 
technology in supporting a more efficient use of distributed energy generation from local energy 
communities, as well as identifying the key technological and societal challenges of integrating CE 
storage into the wider energy system. In particular, they highlight the importance of financial 
viability of the community’s DER, and the role that storage can have in promoting it, together with 
improved efficiency and increased security of supply. They draw evidence from the experience of 
energy communities such as Feldheim and Sonnen in Germany, where CE storage has been used to 
provide balancing and ancillary services to larger energy systems, creating synergies between the 
local and national system. For example, Energiequelle (a wind turbine developer) supported the 
Feldheim energy community in developing 10MWh energy storage, used for local balancing and 
also to provide frequency regulation for the TSO. 
Interestingly the Bannister House Estate34 and the Trent basin35 communities in the UK have seen 
the involvement of private sector energy services companies (Verv Energy and Smartklub) in 
supporting the development of business models for these communities, which may prove to be 
financially sustainable. Other energy communities or municipalities in the UK, such as Bristol and 
Barnsley, have promoted the involvement of local network operators in the management and 
coordination of the local energy system (DSO model) and are developing further engagement 
between energy communities and DSOs to find mutually beneficial opportunities. 
3.4. Case studies of DER market participation 
Regulatory reform: the California DRAM and DER programmes (U.S.A)  
DRAM (Demand Response Auction Mechanism) is an initiative (trial) that encourages the 
participation of third parties, such as DR aggregators, in the provision of DR capacity via a pay-as-
bid auction. DRAM is seen as an alternative to bilateral negotiations, specifically Aggregator 
Management Portfolio – AMP, or other non-competitive mechanisms for DR offerings, and is ruled 
by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC). The DRAM programme allows the participation 
of DR aggregators (third party providers) with customers (residential and non-residential) in the 
Investor Owned Utilities36 (IOUs) service area, with 20% of total of total procured DRAM bids by 
each IOU having to come from the residential sector and specific budgets for each IOU.37 Four 
DRAM pilot projects have already been concluded.38 The CPUC has authorised a 5-6 year extension 
of DRAM, subject to improvements in the programme’s design and oversight procedures, to 
monitor progress. 
Under this approach, DR aggregators bid directly in the CAISO market through a Scheduling 
Coordinator (SC) and the utility (IOU) acquires the capacity (system, local, flexible capacity). DR 
aggregators offer different demand response products such as Proxy Demand Resources (PDR), 
Reliability Demand Response Resources (RDRR) and receive capacity (resource adequacy) 
payments by IOUs. Capacity may vary by month.39 IOUs claim credit for the capacity and are not 
                                               
34 See www.hackneyenergy.org.uk/bannister-house  
35 See www.projectscene.uk   
36 There are 3 IOUs in California: Southern California Edison (SCE), Pacific Gas and Electricity (PGE) and San Diego Gas 
and Electricity (SDGE). 
37 In latest auction: US$ 6m (SCE, PGE) and US$ 1.5m for SDGE. 
38 These are: 2016 DRAM (Pilot 1), 2017 DRAM (Pilot 2), 2018-2019 (Pilot 3) and 2019 (Pilot 4). For further details 
about type of product, delivery period, budget, procurement targets, others, see Anaya and Pollitt (2018, Annex 3).  
39 There are specific obligations for the IOUs in California in terms of Resource Adequacy (RA). A way to acquire RA is 
also via DR, among other methods. Commission DR requirements to qualify for Resource Adequacy (RA) require the 
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involved in CAISO market settlements. The selection of offers is subject to: (1) a cap of long term 
avoided cost of generation for 2019 set at $113.20/kW-year and (2) a simple average August bid 
price cap. The minimum bid size depends on the DR product (100 kW (PDR), 500 kW (RDRR) per 
month) with a maximum bid per month of 10 MW.  
CPUC (2019) established six criteria for the evaluation of the programme used to assess progress 
so far. From the first four projects the following observations can be made: DRAM has promoted 
the engagement of new participants (Demand Response Providers) and new consumers (mainly 
residential), many of whom had not previously participated in other programmes. However, it was 
unclear whether the new participant firms could be considered “viable”, as out of the seven new 
sellers in DRAM 1 and 2, only three fulfilled the full terms of their contracts. The other terminated 
or reassigned their contract.). Between 74-95% of the customers that participated in DRAM 1 and 
2 had never participated in an IOU DR programme previously in California. The capacity price offers 
were competitive for the biggest two IOUs, in comparison with the long-term avoided cost of 
generation, but there were mixed results for SDGE. DRAM bid prices were generally not 
competitive in the energy market, compared with prices of IOUs who were better at scheduling DR 
resources. In terms of contract obligations, improvements were observed over time, but the results 
are still inconclusive, with 65% of contracted capacity in 2016 and 97% in 2018. Mixed results 
were also observed regarding the performance of DRAM resources in terms of their ability to 
respond to dispatches by CAISO.  
Some important lessons can be learnt from the pioneering experience of the DRAM programme, 
particularly with respect to market design considerations. A high level of concentration was 
observed in the DRAM market and for this reason the CPUC is thinking of imposing a limit of 25% 
of DRPs share for the two largest ones and a lower percentage for SDGE. A requirement for 
deposits to be made up-front, as well as the imposition of bid fees may also be introduced, to 
discourage bidders from making declining offers.40 Adjustments in the price cap might also be 
required to improve offer valuation,41 while improvements in the penalties and incentive 
performance schemes are also being considered. 
The set-aside quota for residential customers (20%) has also generated concerns as it may inhibit 
fair competition, so that a reduction of the set-aside is currently being evaluated. Challenges in the 
registration of residential customers via DRPs were also encountered such as the high number of 
requirements/steps involved, in comparison with the IOUs DR programmes and with other 
programmes from other jurisdictions, such as The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT),42 
limited the enrolment of residential customers. IOUs might also have an inherent advantage as it is 
much easier for them to obtain key data for their own customers and enrol them in the IOUs DR 
programmes. Customer recruitment costs are also among the main barriers in the successful 
development of the programme.  
Even though a decline in the DRAM auction bid prices over time was observed in the three first 
DRAM pilot solicitations (PG&E, 2017, p.30), DRAM bid prices and resources were not competitive 
with those in the wholesale markets. Indeed, DRAM resources were found to be less active and 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
40 Declining offers refer to those offers from bidders that were shortlisted but then decided to withdraw their offers 
(during the selection process or after being selected).  
41 In the selection of offers, a simple average August bid price cap was set as a filter or screen for offers. The new 
recommendation is to replace the price cap based on Long-Run Avoided Costs (LRAC) with a Net Market Value (NMV) 
cap based on the adjustment of this value.  
42 For instance, the requirement of “utility account number to enrol in DR programs” can be a limitation, with a 84% 
drop-off in customer enrolments. In ERCOT, the utility account number is not required for enrolling customers.  
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were re-scheduled far less frequently - during the CAISO system peak load hours - than other 
resources. A lack of information about awarded contracts - including administrative costs - has 
generally been observed in different auctions mechanisms from California, including DRAM. 
Therefore, the CPUC has now suggested publishing information about awarded DRAM contracts and 
administrative costs, starting from the next DRAM series.  
The DER initiative, also introduced in the CAISO market, allows the participation of aggregated DER 
- as a new type of market resource43 - in the wholesale energy and ancillary services markets. 
Programmes with participation of aggregated DR in the wholesale market already exist across 
CAISO and other ISOs/TSOs, however this considers a no-export rule on DER. This represents a 
pioneering programme which other ISOs/RTOs are trying to follow with the support of FERC.44 A 
deep coordination between TSOs and DSOs is one of the key challenges in enabling the 
aggregation of DER (CAISO, 2018). However, an initial evaluation suggests that the programme, 
as implemented by CAISO, has not worked as expected, particularly in relation to the level of 
participation of DER aggregators (Gundlach and Webb, 2018). Several barriers to the development 
of the programme have been identified (Gundlach and Webb, 2018) including: regulatory barriers, 
such as DER aggregation still being treated as conventional generating facilities, economic barriers 
including low revenue expectations and/or the existence of alternative revenue streams (i.e. NEM 
and wholesale PDR/RDR programmes) and technical barriers associated with complex metering 
capability and the need to balance supply and demand considering two-way flows. 
Transactive energy: the Brooklyn Microgrid (U.S.A.) 
In 2016, the first transaction between consumers in a P2P energy platform (Exergy - XRG) took 
place on President Street in Brooklyn, New York (LO3 Energy, 2016). Exergy utilises Ethereum 
Blockchain software to allow consumers to trade energy locally, using PayPal, while chronologically 
securing the transaction in an immutable and irreversible shared ledger. The joint venture led by 
LO3’s start-up, TransActive Grid and app developer ConsenSys, originated by linking up five 
consumers with another five prosumers willing to buy and sell electricity, respectively, on President 
Street (New Scientist, 2016). 
The project expanded to sixty solar sites, involving 500 households, by the end of 2017 (NERA, 
2018).45 LO3 Brooklyn Microgrid (BMG) is seeking approval from New York authorities for a 
regulatory sandbox to allow its marketplace.46 BMG, a benefit corporation, although running on a 
for-profit basis, aims to support local environmental and social initiatives.  
The microgrid treats individual assets as ‘nodes’ within the power system that deliver a variety of 
value streams such as flexibility, capacity and frequency regulation that can be shared bilaterally 
(Exergy, 2019). Exergy refers to the value garnered through such bilateral exchanges as 
“transactive energy” which can help reduce combustion and distribution losses by incentivising 
those value streams that lead to a more efficient energy system. The value streams, therefore, are 
not denominated in kWh in the traditional sense, but reflect the ‘tokenisation’ of the type of service 
provided by the contracted unit of energy. 
                                               
43 Each aggregation has a minimum of 0.5MW. Aggregation can be composed of DER with one or multiple pricing 
nodes. If the aggregation includes DER located at different pricing nodes, then the aggregation is limited to 20 MW.  
44 The tariff revision to support the participation of DER in CAISO markets was approved by FERC in June 2016 (Docket 
N. ER 16-1085-000).  
45 Exergy creates a marketplace which exists across traditional infrastructure. In other words, the platform consists of 
a physical layer and of a virtual layer. The virtual layer allows energy to be transacted across the existing distribution 
infrastructure run by Con Edison, the independent system operator. The Brooklyn Microgrid only decouples from the 
grid in emergency situations. For further details, see https://www.brooklyn.energy/ 
46 For further details, see https://microgridknowledge.com/brooklyn-microgrid-regulatory-sandbox/ 
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Each site member requires an app, must take XRG tokens to a smart meter and install the TAG-e 
G2 blockchain device to transfer data. Together the technologies can monitor the electrons 
generated and/or traded. Electricity can be traded autonomously in near real-time, providing 
prosumers with the opportunity to sell electricity within the community at a profit, rather than to 
the utility, in exchange for net-metering credits deducted from the following month’s energy bill 
(Power Technology, 2017; Medium, 2019). Profits raised from trade are expected to remain within 
the community and electricity can even be gifted to others in the system such as family or friends, 
or donated to low-income households (New Scientist, 2016). 
The app will allow members to set preferences, further tailoring the automated contracts. The 
visibility to both microgrid members and the local network ensures the ‘seamless’ balance of 
electricity within the system (Exergy, 2017). Likewise, visibility of the source - where and from 
whom electricity is transacted - can lead to the price differentiation of electricity supply (Exergy, 
2017). For example, consumers could set the preference to purchase their neighbours’ surplus 
electricity, at a premium or discount, and only purchase electricity from the cheapest traditional 
supplier if their neighbours are unable or unwilling to sell at the buy price. 
Furthermore, autonomy of supply and demand can potentially provide security to communities 
faced with an increase in the occurrence and severity of extreme weather events caused by the 
growing climate crisis. In New York, utilities manage the operation of distributed systems, giving 
traditional suppliers control over whether or not solar PV can generate power at a time of crises 
(Power Technology, 2017). An initial aim of the project was to incorporate technology that would 
protect local communities in the event of an emergency. 
The circular economy: De Ceuvel Microgrid (Netherlands) 
The Spectral and Alliander47 partnership exemplifies how community energy, microgrids and 
trading platforms could coalesce. The project, located in De Ceuvel, Amsterdam, is a private, 
behind-the-meter smart-grid, promoting sustainable local urban living and the creation of a 
“circular, resource-based economy” (Spectral, 2019).  
Funded by a start-up grant of €250,000 and a €200,000 bank loan in 2012 (NYT, 2014),48 the 
community, comprising 16 office buildings, a café, a bed and breakfast and a greenhouse, has 
sought to become self-sufficient. Most of the offices are equipped with solar PV panels, 150 in total, 
generating around 36,000 kWh of electricity per annum (De Ceuvel, 2017,49 providing enough 
electricity to power most of the office heating systems and residual electricity used for other 
services, exports or to generate tradeable tokens.50 
By September 2017, the community adopted Jouliette, named after the unit of energy, the Joule. 
Jouliette is a P2P token, which can only be used within the De Ceuvel ecosystem, that facilitates 
the management and trade of energy as well as the purchase of other goods and services. 
Blockchain-based technology enables members to make secure transactions, either manually or 
                                               
47 Spectral is a smart energy services company. Alliander is a large DSO. 
48 Interestingly, the 9-year payback of the loan does not rely on the stream of value generated by the solar panels, but 
the payments made by tenants of the workspaces of €65 per square meter per year (NYT, 2014). 
49 Sharing 36,000 kWh of electricity between 16 office buildings is equivalent to 2250 kWh (with no residual power). 
Allocating 2,000 kWh per office would issue 4,000 kWh for other services, for example. This is not wholly unrealistic if 
the office space has a high efficiency rating and is resident to micro businesses whose activity takes place primarily 
during the day. 
50 Compared to cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, tokens do not require as much energy to generate. This is due to the 
fact that cryptocurrencies require ‘miners’ who utilise increasingly advanced processors to solve algorithmic puzzles in 
order to create a secure ledger within the Blockchain (The Economist, 2018). Tokens instead are not mined but 
created, and traded, per unit of electricity generated by the solar panels.  
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automated, between “virtual currency wallets” without the need for an intermediary (Metabolic, 
2019; Smart Stories, 2019, see also section 3.2). All transactions are decentralised, transparent 
and automatically verified within the community, while the value of the energy tokens, unlike 
cryptocurrencies, reflects the utilitarian value of a commodity, electricity (Mulligan, 2018). 
Members can trade Jouliette tokens for goods in the De Ceuvel community, e.g. at the café (BSM, 
2018). A single Jouliette token is worth 0.1 kWh (De Ceuvel, 2017). Note that in the Netherlands 
prosumers can sell surplus, or unsynchronised, electricity to the grid in exchange for the FiT of 
0.099€/kWh.51 This implies that an americano (€2.60) in the De Ceuvel café is worth up to 260 
tokens. Future services such as local banking and car sharing are expected to be exchanged for 
tokens within the microsystem.  
Access to the Jouliette platform provides members with the necessary functionality to manage their 
energy transactions. The transactions and power-flows of electricity between members of the 
community and the grid can be monitored in real-time. This is made possible by high-resolution 
data and machine learning, allowing members to visualise their current and forecast energy 
consumption and production. The blockchain platform (MultiChain) provides both permission free 
access to the public as well as secure private access to known members validating the suppliers 
and consumers of local generation (Spectral, 2018; Andoni et al., 2019). 
During Phase 2 of the project (May 2018), Spectral engaged with the De Ceuvel community in 
“participatory sessions” to shape the rules of the Jouliette platform (Spectral, 2019b). According to 
Spectral (2019), the private nature of the smart grid allows the community to trade electricity, 
unbound by existing market barriers. Despite the fact that we are interested in the electricity 
trading potential of this project it should be noticed that the project’s survival was threatened due 
to the lack of a gas connection in the development. Indeed, the New York Times (2014) reported 
the potential illegality of the system, since there is no gas connection at the site (NYT, 2014).52 EU 
legislation requires that all citizens have a guaranteed electricity connection and not necessarily a 
connection to a gas grid, which sheds doubt on the validity of the claim of illegality (European 
Commission 2019), while Dutch regulation used to require a gas connection but is now being 
reconsidered. Moreover, due to the temporary nature of the workspaces and accommodation, 
people are unlikely to be at risk or vulnerable because of a lack of access to a gas supply. 
The De Ceuvel project aims to expand the smart grid to the surrounding Buiksloterham 
neighbourhood. Despite gaining an exemption from microgrid regulations, providing the 
opportunity to trade energy behind the meter, expanding the smart grid will, “require even more 
careful navigation of the regulatory environment, exploitation of legal loopholes, and certain use-
cases [will not] be possible given existing market conditions” (Spectral, 2018). The potential and 
feasibility of future, rapid expansion of this microgrid is therefore unclear. 
Adoption and engagement: the Verv trading platform (UK) 
Building on the Verv Home Hub (VHH) capabilities,53 Verv has developed a blockchain-based 
energy trading platform (VTP) that aims to incentivise adoption and sustain engagement. A central 
                                               
51 See http://www.res-legal.eu/search-by-country/netherlands/single/s/res-e/t/promotion/aid/premium-tariff-
sde/lastp/171/ 
52 In comparison, De Ceuvel was blocked by the City of Amsterdam from collecting and supplying drinking water due to 
the complexities involved in becoming an official provider (NYT, 2014). 
53 The VHH is a non-intrusive load monitoring device with an ultra-high sampling rate, recording data approximately 
over 1 million times that of a typical smart meter. According to Centrica, smart meters are “pretty dumb” in 
comparison (The Times, 2017). The sampling frequency allows for real-time device recognition by identifying unique 
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pillar of the trading platform is the ultra-high sampling rate of the VHH, which aims to generate 
more accurate forecasts of consumer behaviour (demand) and electricity generation54 (supply). 
What Investment (2017) suggests that the VHH capabilities will allow consumers to purchase 
electricity at the lowest price, similarly to foreign exchange markets. It is not clear however that 
such an arrangement will provide some insurance against price increases. 
Driving forward P2P adoption therefore is the potential gain from trade arising from the differential 
between feed-in tariffs (FiT) and retail energy prices. Verv suggests that prosumers will be 
incentivised to sell their electricity to supplement other prosumers’ and consumers’ demand for a 
premium (above the FiT) and for a discount (below the retail price) – a so-called ‘win-win’. For 
example, the UK export tariff post on 31st July 2012 was 5.38p/kWh and, in 2018, the UK’s 
average variable unit price for electricity was 15.1p/kWh (Ofgem, 2019; BEIS, 2019a). It is 
envisioned that prosumers will “meet in the middle… including transmission and distribution fees”, 
selling electricity to peers at around 11p/kWh (Medium, 2018a; Verv energy, 2018a: 14). 
Participation in P2P schemes needs to be sustainable in a subsidy-free and fair energy system. 
According to the Solar Trade Association (2019), a fair price either reflects the wholesale cost, 
which averaged at around 6p/kWh in 2018, or the system sell price, which in the same year 
followed the FiT at 5.4p/kWh. Following the closure of the UK’s FiT (31st March 2019), suppliers 
with more than 250,000 customers55 will soon be required to purchase surplus renewable 
electricity at a non-zero price – the ‘smart export guarantee’ (BEIS, 2019b). Several suppliers have 
responded to this call, including a new entrant in the retail market, Octopus Energy, which offers to 
purchase electricity at the wholesale rate or a fixed rate of 5.5p/kWh (Solar Trade Association, 
2019). Despite the prevailing differential between the FiT and retail price P in the short-medium 
term, the benefits will be squeezed by transmission and distribution costs D, transaction costs T 
and unobserved costs U. Therefore, for prosumers to be willing to trade with their peers rather 
than export surplus electricity to the grid, and for their peers to find this offer more attractive than 
the market price, the following relationship must hold: FiT + D + T + U < P.  
Verv identifies a mixed approach to minimise T and U. Crucially, blockchain will reduce transaction 
costs, bypassing intermediaries and allowing consumers to digitally track and authenticate 
transactions. Free access to the platform will be funded by Verv’s initial token offering (ITO) and 
revenues accrued by aggregating and monetising data. The free Verv app allows consumers with a 
VHH or a smart meter to register to the Verv trading platform (VTP), broadening the scope of the 
trading platform. However, the VHH provides adopters with a transactional advantage as they will 
be able to operate at “the grid-edge” by “trading faster and further ahead” (Verv energy, 2018a). 
To further avoid transaction costs, Verv introduced local aggregators into the VTP, thereby avoiding 
the additional cost of brokering transactions in the public token (VLUX) exchange. The purchase of 
VLUX tokens will be automated via the VTP and exchanged for fiat (e.g. GBP) in a specific locality 
(100-500 households, according to postcode) to reduce the complexity of the blockchain ledger. 
The transaction fee will be set by the local aggregator and absorbed into the sell-price. 
                                                                                                                                                   
energy signatures. The technology uses remote firmware updates (Verv energy, 2019) and is compatible with other 
smart devices (e.g. Alexa). The next generation technology also integrates a consumer access device (CAD), 
connecting the VHH to a smart energy meter using a Zigbee communications chip, which can seek and switch to the 
cheapest energy tariff rates – a crucial development for P2P trading – and based on early trials this feature is expected 
to reduce annual energy bills by around £80 (Medium, 2018a).  
54 Using demand data, satellite imaging, weather forecasts, cloud cover, opacity and geolocation data, for example.  
55 Smaller suppliers can opt-in. 
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The Verv app is designed to reduce unobserved costs (e.g. hassle) by maximising benefits and 
minimising costs through automated trading. The app will optimise trading based on the attributes 
of technologies such as battery capacity and consumer preferences (e.g. min/max sell/buy price). 
The VTP system identifies a window for trade hours in advance. A smart contract is then forged by 
matching the sell-price, set by prosumers and traditional suppliers, to the buy price, set by 
consumers and prosumers, and the transaction is complete upon receipt of payment per kWh. 
Deep learning AI and neural network matching algorithms further reduce the need for consumer 
engagement: “…the AI algorithms should be able to learn… patterns of engagement with energy 
trading. Rather than requiring ongoing input…, it is anticipated that the algorithms will learn how 
the user interacts with the platform… that ensures long-term, sustainable customer engagement.” 
(Verv energy, 2018a). 
Community energy: the Banister House Estate, London & Project SCENE, Nottingham 
(UK) 
Repowering London spearheaded a community energy scheme based in Hackney’s Banister House 
Estate (London, UK) by installing solar panels on 14 tower blocks, to provide power to communal 
areas, while exporting most of the electricity to the grid.56 Following this first CE project, 
Repowering London and Verv implemented a trial of 40 Verv home hubs (VHH) installed in 
households, together with communal batteries, that allow surplus electricity to be stored and 
traded between flats (Green Running, 2017). Verv completed the UK’s first physical P2P trade of 
energy using blockchain in April 2018 (Verv energy, 2018a), representing 1kWh of surplus 
electricity traded from one tower block to another (Medium, 2018a). 
At present it is not clear how the property rights will be allocated, nevertheless the partnership 
between Verv and Centrica57 will explore how to conduct “fair and transparent” billing using 
blockchain and analyse the transactions that take place between peers and energy suppliers such 
as British Gas (Verv energy, 2018a). This represents an interesting trial due to the involvement of 
the UK’s largest energy supplier. The blockchain-based energy trading platform will allow for a 
secure record of transactions in real-time (Medium, 2018b). 
Verv envisions creating an almost self-sustaining energy community using the functionality of VHH 
and the Verv Trading Platform to provide bill reductions to households, many of whom purchase 
energy using relatively expensive pre-payment meters (Medium, 2018a; Medium, 2018b). 
Combining the several streams of value mentioned above, plus the option for consumers to opt-in 
to demand-side response services as well as the ability to sell and manage their data with third 
parties, (Medium, 2018a) suggests bills could fall by 50% by 2020. 
The Trent Basin’s Project SCENE in Nottingham involves a 500-home energy network and relies on 
a digital assistant system to promote optimal energy use. It includes Europe’s largest shared 
battery (2MWh). Smartklub is the ESCo operating the system and was involved in developing the 
new business models required for the community, and in creating a viable energy service company 
to operate the low carbon money saving offer on behalf of the residents. Smartklub design and 
                                               
56 Launched in 2015 by the residents of Banister House Estate, Repowering and Hackney Energy. The 102kWp solar 
array is the largest community energy social housing scheme. The scheme has raised over £149,000 as part of a 
community share offer and aims to cut carbon emissions by almost 700 tonnes over a 20-year lifetime (Repowering, 
2019).  
57 Centrica has invested £1.9m into Verv (Verv energy, 2018b). Additional funding has been awarded as part of 
Ofgem’s Regulatory Sandbox (over £100k) - thereby exempt from usual regulation - and BEIS’ Energy Entrepreneur’s 
fund (£215k) to simulate a UK-wide blockchain-based energy trading solution (Global Energy News, 2017; Green 
Running, 2017). £1.1m in equity was raised in an initial round of crowdfunding, via Crowdcube, followed by £768,420 
in 2019. 
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manage their ongoing energy operations to save money and carbon while using the latest 
renewable technology and transport solutions. 
Appendix 1 summarises the business model cases discussed in the previous sections.  
3.5. Discussion and lessons learned  
The evidence from the literature and the case studies discussed in this section have highlighted 
some important features of the new economic agents and organisations emerging in an energy 
sector currently in transition.58 The emergence and widespread adoption of low carbon technologies 
and ICT technologies, which can support market transactions, has opened up opportunities to 
improve the system’s efficiency by engaging traditionally passive users. Across different countries, 
projects and demonstration activities have been developed to prove the commercial viability of new 
business models relying on the innovative use of technology aimed at promoting consumer 
engagement and the provision of flexibility services. Different levels of success have been 
observed, related in part to the institutional and market characteristics of the countries where 
these projects were developed. These emerging technological and business opportunities are, 
however, also leading to questions about the potential challenges associated with changes in the 
competitive market conditions and with the social welfare impact of these new ways of operating 
and engaging with the energy system. 
One of the potentially challenging issues that will need to be addressed in order to guarantee fair 
and competitive market conditions is the problem of externalities arising from the activity of new 
market actors. While the emergence of aggregators as new market players can facilitate and 
promote the supply of flexibility services, it can also generate inefficiencies in the system, not only 
by causing unplanned imbalances, for which financial compensation will be required, but also by 
limiting the ability of traditional suppliers to provide a stable and reliable supply to retail 
consumers, by cherry-picking consumers with the most profitable load profile. To correct for this 
potential externality some form of compensation would be required that correctly accounts for the 
opportunity costs and lost revenues incurred by retailers. The determination of the correct cost 
reference for such externalities will be a challenging task because the obvious choice of wholesale 
price, as a measure of opportunity cost, does not reflect the business conditions under which 
retailers operate in a ‘flexible system’, as in this emerging marketplace, business-as-usual is not 
clearly defined. Additional externalities could arise from microgrid operations at the local level, 
which however could be avoided through effective coordination with DSOs and with appropriate 
cost-reflecting charging mechanisms. 
With respect to the emergence of trading platforms as systems that can facilitate an efficient use of 
DER, the evidence provided in this section does not clarify whether sufficient financial benefits will 
be available to consumers in order to motivate their engagement with a potentially complex system 
that may require the modification of lifetime habits. Bringing together smart meter technology, 
blockchain and apps could lead to energy transactions being tailored to reflect not only the 
attributes of distributed energy resources, but also the preferences of consumers and prosumers. 
However, transaction costs and unobserved costs incurred by consumers will have to be negligible, 
otherwise the differential between a FiT or other subsidies and the market price will be squeezed to 
such an extent that only factors other than price, such as altruism, localism and environmental 
preferences, will drive consumers’ willingness to participate in P2P systems.  
                                               
58 It is important to note that, in our analysis of business model cases, we have been unable to gather sufficient 
evidence about the different taxation regimes to which the different projects are subject. Therefore, we are unable to 
assess opportunities for monetary gains which arise from favourable taxation regimes in the cases examined.  
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Despite the expectations about wide-ranging opportunities offered by blockchain as a decentralised 
payment system, doubts remain about its suitability for application in energy systems. 
Furthermore, concerns remain about public acceptance of this new system in relation to the 
protection of privacy and data management issues linked to automated systems. Zhou et al. 
(2016) talk about the importance of value-tapping for microgrids/energy communities in order to 
achieve financial viability, as well as willingness to participate from the point of view of individual 
consumers. In this context energy communities represent an interesting organisation as, beyond 
financial viability, they also value the creation of social capital, and can generate wider benefits to 
participants, including autonomy from the central system and the promotion of energy 
democratisation,59 namely more widespread control over fuels for generation, energy consumption 
and access to energy. Furthermore, energy communities can help shape and design the “rules of 
the game”, becoming active rule makers rather than rule takers. In this context P2P platforms not 
only transfer units of power but also bargaining power to their participants. 
More generally Governments and regulators should attempt to assess the likely impact of new 
business models for distributed energy generation and emerging suppliers of non-traditional energy 
services on social welfare. In particular, they should address potential distributional issues 
associated with the exclusion from access to innovative technologies and additional costs that could 
be borne by consumers tied to traditional network, who are likely to be among the most vulnerable 
in society. Indeed, the investment costs of the technologies involved in decentralised energy 
systems could prevent low-income households from becoming active market participants, 
potentially widening the gap between the haves and have-nots through a transfer of wealth from 
retailers and aggregators to more wealthy households. 
Care should be taken that the business models of microgrids do not rely on exploiting inefficiencies 
in the pricing structure of the distribution network operator (e.g. too high Feed in tariffs, net 
metering). In the short run this will just shift costs to vulnerable users without creating social 
gains, and in the long run it becomes unviable once those inefficiencies in tariff structure have 
been addressed. We discuss the role of the design of tariffs in section 4. 
As one of the barriers to CE’s development has been identified as the inability to achieve efficient 
scale, the participation of private partners (retailers, energy service companies, investment firms, 
aggregators, DSOs, or housing cooperatives) in the CE might be useful in providing funding and 
know-how. However, the Directive’s definition of energy communities as legal entities with open, 
voluntary participation and controlled by members or shareholders who are natural persons or local 
authorities limits the business models that may be available to private parties under a CE 
framework. For instance, risk sharing and co-ownership of assets with private parties might 
become difficult. We therefore expect that some (larger-scale) community projects will not take the 
legal status of an energy community, and that the energy communities will be more appealing in 
those situations where CEs are primarily established in order to make a community independent 
from established suppliers and traditional utilities, and create local bottom-up participation in 
energy markets. It is also important to point out that that the efficiency gains from these types of 
organisations could arise from the avoidance of transaction costs associated with participating in 
organised markets rather than from a reduced use of resources.  
                                               
59 Lemon et al. (2015) discuss these issues in the context of local Government policies aimed at generating energy 
savings and carbon reductions. They identify significant financial and co-ordination constraints as limiting factors in the 
pursuit of energy policy objectives which make it more difficult to achieve financial and environmental gains compared 
to the opportunities to create social value. The authors state that these barriers are likely to apply more broadly to 
local energy initiatives emerging in response to national energy and environmental policies. 
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Member states might decide to allow communities to act as a DSO or to purchase/lease assets 
from existing DSOs. In our case studies we did not encounter this kind of independent operation, 
and this is somewhat unexplored territory. In principle such a Community Network should satisfy 
equivalent requirements as any network operator: maintain reliability and quality standards, not 
favour its own members (with respect to network access and tariffs), charge according to its costs, 
and might have obligation to connect households to its network. Such a Community Network will 
also have to coordinate its network investments with neighbouring DSO/TSOs, to avoid network 
duplication.  
Setting up the appropriate governance structure (association, company) and regulatory framework 
for a Community Network is not straightforward. A light-handed regulation for small-scale 
initiatives, with clear minimal standards, could be allowed in a transitionary phase. If in that case 
an established DSO provides a fallback option, then the DSO should receive a compensation for the 
insurance it provides. 
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4. TSOs and DSOs as buyers 
4.1. Coordination between DSOs and TSOs 
The uptake of DER and the unlock of their capabilities for providing flexible resources is disrupting 
the conventional way how distribution and transmission networks operate and the way how 
customers interact with their respective utilities (AEMO, 2019a).  
On the one hand, the unlock of DER capabilities introduces more options for system operators to 
balance the system (to match demand and supply) and to procure ancillary services (market and 
non-market ancillary services)60 and congestion management services,61 to reduce the need for 
network investment and to integrated higher levels of renewable generation (especially solar PV 
and wind). However, the integration of more DER within the grid also creates more challenges to 
the operation of the networks (e.g. increase in thermal and voltage limits). EVs will also increase 
the demand for electricity, however the potential that this increase may have on the power system 
(assuming full penetration of EVs) varies across countries.62 
On the other hand, customers have the chance to play a more active role by adjusting their 
consumption/generation in response to price signals, then lower household electricity bills are 
expected. Aggregators, suppliers and other parties such as local energy communities are also 
increasing the participation of active customers in the provision of flexible services (i.e. demand 
response) offered locally or to the grid (wholesale market). Innovation is also helping to the 
development and deployment of technology that facilitates DER integration (IRENA, 2019).  
Then in order to facilitate the integration of DER and to reduce the impact that this can have on 
both networks (distribution and transmission), distribution utilities and TSOs need to enhance their 
roles or to adopt new ones (i.e. system operation in the case of distribution utilities) and to 
improve key capabilities (i.e. DER forecasting) in order to manage and dispatch DER efficiently. For 
instance, in California DER forecasting for distribution planning is mandated since 2017.63 Different 
disaggregation methods (for DER forecasting at distribution level) are being explored. These 
methods vary depending on the type of technology (e.g. PV generation, electric vehicles, energy 
storage, etc.), its maturity and available data (SCE, 2018).64 In the UK DER forecasting for 
distribution planning has not been implemented yet.  
The next section explores the responsibilities of the DSO and the TSO in procuring ancillary 
services from DER and proving DER market access (to for instance the wholesale market). Should 
DSO and TSO share responsibilities, or should they be allocated to one of the parties? Do we need 
                                               
60 Despite the expansion of DER, their participation in the wholesale market is still very limited and mainly 
concentrated on the provision of demand response. Different countries and jurisdictions such as the UK, New York and 
California are testing (via pilots) DER capabilities to be used in the wholesale market. However, many of them operate 
under regulatory sandboxes. Some examples of these initiatives are Power Potential in the UK that allows the 
participation of DER in the provision of reactive power support to the system operator (Anaya and Pollitt, 2018) and 
the case studies from California such as DRAM and DER discussed in section 3.  
61 Congestion management can take different forms. It may happen when there is not enough transmission capacity to 
transmit generation due to (1) a rare generation or consumption situation or to (2) the inability to reinforce the grid 
infrastructure on time. This can be mitigated by asking market parties to place location-specific flexibility bids (TenneT, 
2018).  
62 For instance, among eight selected European countries, Italy would be the most affected with a share of current total 
consumption of 48% and Norway the less affected with around 8% only, but considering the share of current 
household consumption instead it would be 208% and 25% respectively (CERRE, 2019b, p. 11).  
63 See: https://drpwg.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Ruling022717.pdf 
64 California is one of the leaders in the USA in introducing DER for distribution planning. Other states are also following 
its steps such as Nevada and Minnesota. 
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instead a third party providing an independent platform to facilitate coordination? We will answer 
those questions by looking at some current proposals for organising markets.65 
4.2. Looking at different proposals for DSO-TSO interactions for DER 
integration  
This section discusses different approaches that are currently being evaluated at country level 
(Australia, the UK) and supported by the energy network associations in each country. The other 
case is a state-level initiative from New York, that is among the pioneers in proposing a new role 
for the distribution utility to integrate and trade DER using a distributed system platform (DSP). 
The last case discusses briefly a recent study for the European transmission and DSOs’ associations 
regarding the market arrangements (between DSOs and TSOs) for congestion management and 
balancing services.  
Australia and three different frameworks for DER dispatch  
Australia is among the world leaders in decentralised generation. According to ENA (2018), in the 
next few years, Australia will be the country with the highest rate of decentralised generation, 
followed by Germany. Then it is imperative to create an appropriate framework to facilitate its 
integration and maximise the benefits. The Energy Networks Australia’s Electricity Network 
Roadmap 2017 has estimated important savings from an early transition that favours DER 
integration. For instance, by 2050 ENA-CSIRO (2017) foresees that there will be a reduction in 
system spend (AU$101b),66 household electricity bill savings (AU$414 pa.),67 reduction of network 
charges (by 30%, 2016 basis),68 among others. In the current economic dispatch situation, 
traditional market customers (transmission connected load/retailers, generating units above 30 
MW) operate directly in the market. Small generators may participate but on a non-schedule 
basis69 and those below 5 MW cannot participate in the market unless they affiliate with a retailer 
or become one. In the ancillary services market, those services can be offered directly by 
generating units (excluding small generator aggregator) and by loads (transmission connected, 
retailers, aggregator DR provider). On the other hand, network support can be agreed between 
DER aggregator/retailer and the utility, then a bespoke agreement is applicable in this case (AEMO-
ENA, 2018a). In light of these facts and in order to find better ways to integrate DER into Australia 
electricity grid, Energy Networks Australia and the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) 
launched the Open Energy Networks project in 2018. The project proposes among other things, 
three options for the future interaction between the Distribution Network Service Provider (DNSP) 
and AEMO. In all the cases, the aggregator/retailer allocates dispatch among DER providers and 
financial settlements remain between AEMO and the retailer. A fourth option has been recently 
proposed (hybrid approach) as an outcome of the continuous consultation workshops. This option 
emerges as a result of different concerns that the three options may have in terms of complexity of 
the model (option 3), conflict of interest with the two roles of the distribution utility (option 2) and 
                                               
65 In the different approaches to be discussed, ESO/TSO may refer to AEMO, NGESO or NYISO. 
66 This figure is estimated by comparing the counterfactual and The Roadmap scenario regarding electricity system 
total expenditure by 2050, estimated in AU$988b and AU$888b respectively. These refer to cumulative figures (in real 
terms). Total expenditure comprises costs regarding centralised generation, connected on-site generation, distribution, 
transmission and off grid.  
67 A similar approach is used for household electricity bill savings (comparison of both scenarios) with two sources of 
savings: (1) a reduction of the need for expenditure on network capacity replacement or expansion and (2) a more 
efficient utilisation of capacity.  
68 Due to the possibility to buy grid services from DER customers, it is possible to avoid the need of AU$16.2b in 
network investment by 2050, reducing average network bills by 30%.  
69 According to AEMO this has been the case considering that the aggregate size of DER is still small, but a central 
dispatch process would be needed if the aggregate size increases importantly, as predicted.  
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the management of the market and system (both at transmission and distribution) by one single 
entity (option 1). The final recommendation will take into account the results of a cost benefit 
analysis on each of the four models, among others. A brief explanation of the four options is 
provided below.  
Option 1 (Single integrated platform) 
AEMO, the Australian Energy Market Operator, is responsible for operating and managing the 
central market platform and for balancing the whole electricity transmission system. Under this 
approach aggregators/retailers/VPP platforms70 interact with the central platform and send their 
bids to it. AEMO optimises the dispatch of DER in NEMDE71 taking into consideration transmission 
network constraints and distribution/local network constraints (information provided by the DNSP 
to the central market operator). Depending on the evaluation, AEMO may proceed to economically 
dispatch DER along with other resources such as transmission connected load, large scale 
generation, etc. This approach represents an extension of AEMO’s role in the wholesale market and 
envisages a “one-stop shop” with a single entry to the markets.  
Option 2 (Two step tiered regulated platform) 
In this case, there is a distribution level platform operated by the distribution network service 
provider (DNSP).72 The DNSP is then responsible for the optimisation of DER dispatch. The DNSP 
evaluates the bids received from aggregators/retailers considering distribution network constraints. 
Information about aggregated bids at each transmission connection points is sent to AEMO which 
includes the aggregated bids in the NEMDE dispatch optimisation. After determining the dispatch 
targets, AEMO gives this information to the DNSP who then proceeds with the disaggregation of the 
dispatch targets to each aggregator considering their respective bids. This would require an 
expansion of the DNSP roles and new capabilities/resources. In addition, a change in the way in 
which DNSPs are funded would be required.  
Option 3 (Independent DSO)  
In this case, an independent DSO (iDSO) is proposed. The iDSO is in charge of optimising DER 
dispatch considering the DNSP technical limits. A single iDSO would be needed for each distribution 
network. Under this approach, the iDSO receives the bids from the aggregator/retail and optimises 
DER dispatch considering distribution constraints, then provides the aggregated bids to AEMO. 
AEMO proceeds with the NEMDE dispatch optimisation. Finally, the iDSO is the one that allocates 
DER dispatch among aggregators according to bids. This is the option that provides the greatest 
level of decentralisation, with less conflict of interest and at the same time the one with the most 
complex solution with multiple interfaces between iDSO and DNSP (to inform about distribution 
network constraints, real time network status, operational forecast), and between iDSO and AEMO 
(to inform about co-optimisation and aggregated bids, schedules) (AEMO-ENA, 2018b).  
Option 4 (Hybrid platform) – New Proposal  
A single central market platform, operated by AEMO, is proposed under this approach. In this case 
AEMO not only organises and operates the central market but also optimises all DER bids, 
                                               
70 Aggregators are not allowed to participate directly in the market. They need to be affiliated with a retailer or to 
become one.  
71 NEMDE (National Electricity Market Dispatch Engine) is the software developed and used by AEMO to maximise value 
of trade subject to different constraints. However, under specific circumstances (that results in NEMDE fail to solve), a 
constraint relaxation procedure (set by AEMO) can be applied. For further details, see: 
https://www.aemo.com.au/Electricity/National-Electricity-Market-NEM/Security-and-reliability/Dispatch-information 
72 This refers to the electricity distribution utility.  
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managing and communicating distribution network constraints (two-sided market platform). For 
this purpose, a distribution services market (DSM) platform is required and operated by AEMO too, 
instead of the DNSP. The distribution utility (or DNSP) provides operating envelopes73 to assist in 
market bid development. Operating envelopes are expected to be static at the beginning but will 
become dynamic (estimated in shorter timescales) when DER visibility improves (AEMO, 2019b).  
The UK and five future DSOs74 worlds  
The participation of DER in the wholesale/ancillary service markets is still limited in the United 
Kingdom and mainly concentrated on demand response services provided by industrial or 
commercial customers (residential participation is null), aggregated capacity or as individual units. 
At distribution level, we observe bespoke arrangements and those provided based on connection 
arrangements. Most recently a market-based approach has been proposed for allocating flexible 
capacity using an online platform Piclo (formerly known as Open Utility).75  
The BEIS/Ofgem Smart Systems and Flexibility Plan launched in July 2017 aims to deliver a 
smarter and more flexible energy system that enables consumers to benefit from the use of energy 
at lower prices and to reward them for being flexible (by altering generation/consumption). Based 
on this initiative, a more active participation of DER in the provision of flexible services is expected. 
Benefits of the transition to a smart energy system in the UK are estimated to be in the region of 
up to £40bn by 2050.76 The UK’s Energy Networks Association (ENA) is working on the Open 
Networks Project which lays the foundation of the smart grid in the UK, in line with the Smart 
Systems and Flexibility Plan. The project involves the collaboration of different stakeholders such 
as Ofgem, BEIS, UK and Ireland’s electricity network operators, among others. The ENA Open 
Networks Project explores the different architectures for integrating and managing smarter and 
decentralised energy systems. There are five workstreams associated with this project. 
Workstream 377 explores the DSO functionalities that allow the integration and use of DER services 
and that supports the optimisation of the investment and operation of the system. In July 2018, 
ENA released a consultation document and presented different approaches of ‘Future Worlds’ for 
the implementation of the enhanced DSO functions.78 A short description of Future Worlds is 
presented below. In all cases, DSO and ESO are responsible for the strategic design of their 
respective networks. In addition, flexible services can be provided by three different parties: DER, 
customers (load) and local energy communities.  
                                               
73 “Operating envelopes indicate to customers the export and/or import limits that they must operate within for safe 
and secure running of the network” (AEMO 2019b, p. 26).  
74 In Great Britain, the traditional electricity distribution utility is called “Distribution Network Operator (DNO)”. The 
switch from DNO to DSO implies new capabilities related to active management, better DER visibility and market 
operation, among others. In the rest of Europe, electricity distribution utilities are called DSOs.  
75 Piclo is a trading platform that helps network operators contract flexible services from different energy resources. 
Providers of flexible services need to register their assets on Piclo. Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks (SSEN) 
has become the first DNO in the UK to procure flexible services using this platform with a fully commercial contract 
(before, this contracted capacity from flexible services was allowed via trials only with two DNOs: UK Power Networks 
and SSEN). See: https://www.current-news.co.uk/news/piclo-pens-milestone-flex-agreement-with-ssen  
76See:https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/568982/An_
analysis_of_electricity_flexibility_for_Great_Britain.pdf 
77 The other workstreams are not fully independent of Workstream 3 but are related to it to some extent. These are 
Workstream 1 (T-D investment and planning), Workstream 2 (customer service), Workstream 4 (network access and 
charging arrangements) and Workstream 5 (communications with stakeholders).  
78 The Smart Grid Architecture Models (SGAMs) were used for the identification of specific roles of key parties within 
each Future World. See: http://www.energynetworks.org/assets/files/Modelling-DSO-Transition-Using-
SGAM_Issue2.1_PublicDomain.pdf 
 
CERRE 2019 | Smart Consumers in the Internet of Energy: Flexibility Markets & Services from Distributed Energy Resources    51/84  
World A: DSO coordinates 
In this world, the DSO has a central role in the procurement and dispatch of DER and other 
customers connected to its network that offer their services for distribution network constraint 
management, for services required by the ESO79 (regional, national) and for those required by 
neighbouring DSOs. Pre-defined power exchange schedules for power flow, which reduces the level 
of transmission constraints, are agreed between the DSO and ESO. Then, the DSO behaves as a 
non-commercial aggregator or as another transmission connected party that is able to offer 
services (from DER, customers, others) to the ESO under a non-discriminatory approach along with 
those services offered by transmission-connected services providers such as generators, loads and 
storage. The DSO needs to establish its own settlement system to confirm the delivery of the 
services provided.  
World B: Coordinated DSO-ESO procurement and dispatch 
In contrast with World A where there is only one entry to procure services from DER and other 
customers (via the DSO), here those services can be procured directly by the ESO as well as using 
a non-discriminatory approach. There is a central ancillary services market for flexibility resources 
that are connected to the transmission and distribution networks. The DSO and ESO would need to 
work together with a higher level of coordination (in line with the increase in the number of active 
DER) in order to ensure efficient procurement and optimal dispatch.  
World C: Price-driven flexibility 
This architecture introduces price flexibility arrangements, rather than just contracted flexibility 
arrangements like those in World B, that allow the parties to change demand or generation in 
response to energy prices and network signals. World C has been proposed considering Ofgem’s 
reform of electricity network access and forward-looking charges.80 The figure of a central market 
for the procurement of ancillary services applies here also, similar to World B (in both transmission 
and distribution) and also the need for coordination between both system operators to optimise 
procurement. However, considering that in this case the parties would respond to enhanced prices 
and network signals, less need for system operator intervention would be expected. World A, B, D 
and E could be adapted based on the price-driven flexibility principle from World C.  
World D: ESO coordinate(s) 
Similar to World A, with only one entry where the ESO has the central role and acts as the market 
facilitator for all DER.81 The DSO communicates with the ESO about its requirements (for short and 
long term services). ESO presents to service providers both types of requirements to optimise 
overall procurement and dispatches both. The ESO is responsible for the settlement process too.  
World E: Flexibility co-ordinator(s) 
Information on service requirements from the DSO and ESO is provided to the Flexibility 
Coordinator which acts as the independent and neutral market facilitator. A common platform is 
used for this purpose. The Flexibility Coordinator can be represented by a national entity or by one 
or more regional entities.  
                                               
79 In this case, ESO refers to National Grid, the electricity system operator from Great Britain (NGESO). 
80 See: https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/transmission-networks/charging/reform-network-access-and-forward-
looking-charges 
81 This could be limited to a minimum value (i.e. DER connected at HV rather than those connected at LV).  
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One of the actions associated with Workstream 3 was an independent Impact Assessment of the 
Future Worlds described above. Baringa Partners was appointed to deliver the Impact Assessment. 
In the identification of costs and benefits of each World, they took into account the way in which 
each of them can help avoid network investment, reduce the costs of balancing services and avoid 
the need for new generating units.82 For the qualitative analysis they considered a set of 30 criteria 
identified by the ENA and stakeholders. Results from the Impact Assessment suggest that there is 
not a preferred Future World but there are pros and cons associated to each one, especially in 
terms of complexity of operation, cost and time of implementation. The study also suggests that 
the Future Worlds are even more viable when combining World C within each of the others (A, B, D 
and E). The study shows that by 2030, Worlds A and B perform relatively better than the others. 
However, by 2040 and 2050, due to greater and available gross benefits (more mature Worlds), 
the performance of the Future Worlds is similar (Baringa, 2019).  
It is important to note that the proposal of the five worlds is dependent on the initial structure of 
the UK industry (i.e. with DNOs/DSOs and one ISO). For instance, in the case of Malta there is no 
TSO and there is one DSO (Enemalta), in Ireland and Northern Ireland transmission and 
distribution activities are bundled (ESB and NIA respectively), while in Greece there is a single DSO 
(Hedno).  
New York: the implementation of Distributed System Platforms (DSP) 
Reforming the Energy Vision (REV) is the key energy strategy for New York launched in 2014 by 
the New York Department of Public Service Commission (NY DPS, 2014). REV envisions a 
customer-oriented regulatory reform, where utilities will have the capability to actively manage and 
coordinate different distributed resources, to achieving the Commission’s policy objectives. REV 
mandates the distribution utilities to act as an interface among individual customers and among 
customers and the bulk power system. Distribution utilities are required to act as Distributed 
System Platform Provider (DSPPs) for trading distributed resources.83 The DSPP therefore 
represents the aggregator of aggregators. The six larger investor-owned utilities (IOUs) from New 
York are required to implement the DSP within their networks and act as DSPPs.84 REV discusses 
how important it is to have some degree of harmonisation in products and services across the 
DSPP. Demonstration projects are currently being implemented by the IOUs in order to trial new 
business models (new revenue stream opportunities), new technologies and approaches to assess 
value. The projects are continuously assessed by each utility.85 For further details about REV and 
detailed functions of the DSPP see Pollitt and Anaya (2016).  
                                               
82 Benefits were identified considering two of the National Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios (FES): Community 
Renewables and Two Degrees. In terms of costs, the study includes in the analysis technology costs, interface costs, 
resource costs and business charge costs, among others (Baringa, 2019). 
83 The transition to a DSPP is via incremental steps with a clear set of long-term goals and objectives. Under the DSPP 
model, additional services can be traded such as value-added services offered by the distribution utility and other 
providers (NY DSP, 2014). 
84 The Commission has identified five DSPP roles: (1) Planning functions - DSPP responsible for planning and designing 
the distribution system considering the integration of DER as a primary means of meeting system needs; (2) Market 
functions – DSPP able to understand the net benefits of DER in order to enable effective investment decisions, to craft 
the main products and services in order to capture the monetizable values in the market, and to provide pricing 
structures for DER products and services (i.e. market-based, tariff-based, or contractual); (3) Energy efficiency: DSSP 
to integrate energy efficiency in system planning optimising the economic value of energy efficiency expenditures for 
all customers; (4) Advanced distribution management systems: DSPP able to forecasting load and dispatching 
resources, and balance supply and load both in real time; and (5) Communications infrastructure: DSPP to develop 
communications networks capable of supporting smart grids (NY DSP, 2014).  
85 The list of pilot projects can be found at: 
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/B2D9D834B0D307C685257F3F006FF1D9?OpenDocument 
 
CERRE 2019 | Smart Consumers in the Internet of Energy: Flexibility Markets & Services from Distributed Energy Resources    53/84  
Even though the Commission states that the DSPP role rests better in the distribution utility, there 
are some critics to this approach. The Commission states that an independent party would be 
redundant, inefficient and unnecessarily costly because many of the DSP core functions would be 
integrated with utility planning and system operation (NY DSP, 2015, p. 45). 
One of the main criticisms is related to the conflicts between DER providers and the distribution 
utility, considering that the latter has total control over access and use. Many of the distribution 
utilities that operate in the USA also own generating units, which may jeopardise the effectiveness 
of the competition process. Then an Independent Distribution System Operator (IDSO) would be 
recommended instead, allowing third parties to fairly and fully participate as providers in a 
competitive distribution energy market (Wellinghoff et al., 2014). However in the case of New York, 
some limitations of DER ownership by IOUs have already been set. Among the circumstances for 
the consideration of utility ownership are (NY DSP, 2015, p.70): “(1) procurement of DER has been 
solicited to meet a system need, and a utility has demonstrated that competitive alternatives 
proposed by non-utility parties are clearly inadequate, or more costly than a traditional utility 
infrastructure alternative; (2) a project consists of energy storage integrated into distribution 
system architecture; (3) a project will enable low or moderate income residential customers to 
benefit from DER, where markets are not likely to satisfy the need; and (4) a project is being 
sponsored for demonstration purposes”. It is important to mention that in the case of energy 
storage, the Commission supports their implementation and operation on the utility’s system but 
makes clear that utility ownership at the customer location should not be necessary (NY DSP, 
2015, p. 69). Other jurisdictions in the USA are less strict in terms of DER ownership. In California 
for example, the Commission allows utility storage of up to 50% of the total amount of energy 
storage to be procured by the IOUs, across the three domains (transmission, distribution and 
customer side of the meter). The energy storage target is 1,325 MW by 2020 with installations 
required no later than 2024 (CPUC, 2013). 
The European DSOs and TSOs associations: DSO-TSO coordination in congestion 
management and balancing  
The report performed by the European DSOs and TSOs associations (ENTSO-E - E.DSO, 2019) 
evaluates the interaction between both system operators for congestion management86 in 
distribution and transmission and system balancing87 considering a market-based approach.88 The 
report focuses on flexible services provided by third parties only, at all voltage levels.89 The report 
suggests that the long-term view of system operators is to use a market-based approach for 
allocating flexible services, instead of compulsory limitation procedures. In contrast with the cases 
discussed above (Australia, the UK, New York), this one considers the interactions between TSOs 
and DSOs for the provision of two types of services such as congestion management services and 
balancing services. Three different options are evaluated:90 
                                               
86 Congestion management relates to physical congestion with a focus on active power. Among other types of 
congestions are market and structural congestion. For further details, see Commission Regulation (EU) 2015/1222 at 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/b91aa370-3293-11e5-9f85-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en 
87 Reactive power management (non-frequency ancillary services) has not been analysed in the report.  
88 Among the other solutions are: technical, tariff, connection agreement and ruled-based solutions.  
89 The study identifies a toolbox that comprises different types of solutions, however only the market-based approach 
is evaluated.  
90 In our report, the discussion of the different options is focused on the level of interaction between the TSO and the 
DSO.  
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Option 1: Separated TSO and DSO congestion management 
The DSO congestion management market is separated from the TSO congestion management 
market. However, the TSO may have a separated market for balancing, or a joint one (balancing 
plus congestion management). Then, two single entries are observed for congestion management. 
Separated governance is observed in this approach too (no agreement needed between the two 
operators) however coordination between the TSO and DSO is more difficult (interaction between 
two Merit order list(s) –MOLs-91 is required) in order to avoid discrepancies (i.e. double activation 
of the same asset).  
Option 2: Combined TSO and DSO congestion management, with separated balancing 
A common process for congestion management is created considering the TSOs’ and DSOs’ needs. 
Market parties are exposed to one single entry for congestion management services and one for 
balancing. The TSO and DSO need to coordinate and to agree, among others, the product 
specifications suitable for both system operators’ needs, then coordination between TSO and DSO 
looks more efficient than in Option 1.  
Option 3: combined balancing and congestion management for all system operators together  
Here there is a single entry for both markets, congestion management services and balancing 
(integrated market-based process) where all the bids are combined. In comparison with the other 
two options, this is the one with more complex implementation (overall optimisation and bid 
selection system) and more complex settlement rules to be agreed between system operators and 
market parties.  
Other key recommendations are related to the type of product to ensure that they comply with 
system operators’ needs; are well-defined and come with some level of harmonisation to facilitate 
the exchange between markets) and platform options (easy access, good interoperability, 
avoidance of interference and conflicts, technology and hardware agnostic). The report also 
suggests the creation of a common flexibility resources register for data information exchange,92 
which contains information about the flexibility services provided to system operators, and is visible 
across all them.  
4.3. Discussion and lessons learned  
This section discusses the different proposals for DSO-TSO interactions that allow the trade of 
flexible services provided by DER under different regulatory and market contexts, in the UK, 
Australia, New York and Europe. The one from Europe (proposed by the distribution and 
transmission system operators’ associations) is the only one that evaluates the interaction 
considering the type of product to be offered (congestion management and balancing services). We 
observe that in general, the proposals have some similarities. Fig. 6 summarises them.93 The red 
flag depicts the current situation, with very low participation of flexible services (from DER) in both 
transmission and distribution. The red arrows indicate the potential directions of DSO-TSO future 
interactions.  
                                               
91 A MOL is “a list of electricity bids sorted in order of their bid prices, used for the activation of those bids” (ENTSO-E - 
E.DSO, 2019, p. 44).  
92 System operators would be responsible to check the connection data provided by the units connected to their 
networks.  
93 We only include those from Australia, the UK and New York. World C from the UK was not considered in the analysis 
because it refers to price flexibility arrangements that can be incorporated in the rest of the worlds.  
 
CERRE 2019 | Smart Consumers in the Internet of Energy: Flexibility Markets & Services from Distributed Energy Resources    55/84  
Figure 6: Summary of DSO-TSO coordination/interaction initiatives (Australia, the UK 
and New York) 
 
For example, two of the initiatives propose the creation of an independent party (iDSO in Australia 
– Option 3, Flexibility Coordinator in the UK – World E). In comparison with the other 
options/Worlds, this is the less biased and the most decentralised, but also the most complex and 
costly, with potential duplicability of capabilities (the independent entity would need to perform 
balancing/constraint management activities, that are among the main functions of system 
operators such as AEMO and NGESO). At the same time, this will also require high levels of 
coordination between the independent party and each of the system operators. The other common 
option is when AEMO/NGESO has the main role in procuring flexible services. This is represented 
by point D, 1. In this case, coordination with the DSO is still needed (to inform its requirements). 
There is one single entry to interact. In this case AEMO/NGESO is seen as an unbiased entity too, 
with the expertise in procuring different services. However, this option can be costly due to the 
complex interfaces that are required to coordinate the status of the network (i.e. network 
constraints) with the DSO. A similar approach is observed in Option 4, with a single market 
platform managed by AEMO (via a two-sided market platform). However, in this scenario, DSOs 
have to inform about the operating envelopes for DER (static first and then dynamic), then a larger 
level of intervention by the DSOs may be expected.  
The other option refers to World A when the DSO has the main role in the procurement and 
dispatching of flexible services, but coordination with NGESO is still required to correctly manage 
distribution and transmission constraints. In World B we observe that both system operators are 
responsible for procuring and dispatching flexible services. In this case a high level of coordination 
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is expected between both. An intermediate approach is observed in Option 2 from Australia and the 
case of New York (DSP). In this case, the DSO will still be responsible for the procurement and 
dispatch of flexible services from DER and also needs to coordinate with AEMO. In the case of New 
York, the distribution utility acts as the interface between DER and also between retail DER and the 
system operator (NYISO).94 However, it is expected that the high level of intervention of DSOs or 
ESOs depicted in Fig. 6, decreases over time (black arrows) due to the use of more sophisticated 
techniques such as artificial intelligence and, machine learning, that can improve demand 
forecasting. According to Kufeoglu et al. (2019), artificial intelligence, machine learning and deep 
learning are tools that help to monitor, forecast and schedule energy generation and consumption.  
We observe that in all the cases an expansion of the DSOs roles and capabilities and coordination 
with the ESO is required. Policymakers have not yet identified their preferred option, except for the 
case of New York where the DSO became the DSPP and was mandated by the New York 
Commission. The DSPP also acts as a Market Maker for distributed energy resources and interfaces 
with the TSO. The applicability of one case or another would depend on each jurisdiction (country, 
state), its regulatory environment, market structure and needs. The idea of performing a cost 
benefit analysis, such as the one performed by Baringa in the UK, may help to identify the relative 
costs of selecting either option. However, key differences such as the number and size of the DSOs 
should be taken into account, especially in Europe. In countries such as Germany around 878 DSOs 
operate, however the majority of them (797) have less than 100,000 customers.95  
The application of a common framework for all the DSOs (i.e. World B) regardless of their size may 
not be the most appropriate option (initially), considering that many of the DSOs are very small 
and do not have the capability to respond efficiently in the procurement of flexible services. For 
small DSOs the option of having an independent party (that manages a group of small DSOs that 
operate within the same region) is a possibility. The other aspect is related to unbundling rules. 
DSOs with fewer than 100,000 customers are not subject to unbundling rules, so conflicts of 
interest may occur96 if the DSO has the central role in the procurement and dispatch of flexible 
services from DER. However, some exceptions may apply if we talk about energy storage in Europe 
and in some jurisdictions from the USA such as those already discussed for New York. For further 
details about unbundling rules in the European context see section 5.2.  
  
                                               
94 An important observation is that the dual participation of DER in both the wholesale and distribution market 
simultaneously is not currently allowed under the current NYISO wholesale market rules. The Commission is working 
on the new rules that allow these resources the flexibility to meet both the wholesale and distribution needs 
maximising benefits to consumers (NYISO, 2019, p. 18).  
95https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Areas/ElectricityGas/CollectionCompanySpecificData/
Monitoring/MonitoringReport2017.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 
96 Conflict of interest may exist if DSOs also operate generating units (similar to the electricity distribution utilities in 
the USA). However, DSOs with bundled activities (i.e. D+R) would not be a problem.  
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5. Network Regulation 
In this section we study how network regulation, and in particular that relating to distribution 
networks, might affect the development of the internet of energy. We highlight two topics: (1) the 
network services tariff, and (2) the regulation of network operators.  
5.1. Network tariff  
Network operators are regulated monopolies that recoup their costs by charging network users a 
set of tariffs for their network services. In the past, tariffs for residential customers consisted 
mainly of a flat energy charge proportional to the volume taken from the network (€/KWh) and a 
small connection charge (€/connection). The European Commission (2015) indicates that the 
energy component is above 69% of the final network bill.97 It is broadly recognised, in policy and 
academic circles alike, that the current tariff structure may not be optimal in a future smart energy 
system and that tariffs should become more directly linked to costs. One suggestion is that the size 
of the energy volume component might need to be reduced and that the capacity component 
(€/KW) should become more important. CEER (2017) reports:  
Both the European literature review and the answers to the EC public consultation on 
Energy Market Design (question 15) indicate a general support for a move towards capacity 
based charging, with the option of a hybrid of capacity and consumption based charging to 
incentivise a change in consumer behaviour.98 
But also more advanced tariff structures become feasible in a smart electricity network: tariffs can 
become time and location dependent and can change in response to local network congestion.  
In the next subsection we highlight some of the trade-offs in setting tariffs and derive some 
recommendations.  
Tariff principles 
The determination of network tariffs typically involves a trade-off between objectives. Tariffs 
should among other things:99  
 Lead to economic efficiency: Prosumers have the right incentives to invest in and operate 
distributed energy resources. Hence efficiency includes both static and dynamic efficiency. 
 Satisfy the budget constraints of the network operator and provide a stable income for the 
network operator.  
 Be equitable and fair. This could mean that the largest shoulders bare the largest costs, 
that network users do not receive undue cross-subsidies, that the risks and benefits are 
well shared between network operator and network users, or that consumers in similar 
situations are treated similarly.  
 Be practically and politically implementable and not too complicated to administer.  
                                               
97 European Commission. (2015). Study on tariff design for distribution systems.  
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20150313%20Tariff%20report%20fina_revREF-E.PDF 
98 See for instance also European Commission (2015), and Eurelectric (2016).  
99 Longer lists with more subtle variations of different criteria can be made, but this list represents some of the main 
trade-offs. See also European Commission (2015), section 3, Bonbright (1961) and Pollitt (2018).  
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Those objectives are often conflicting. For instance, economic efficiency requires that network 
services are priced at marginal costs. However, network operators are natural monopolies: the 
average cost of providing network services decreases with the amount of energy distributed. Hence 
under marginal cost pricing the network operator will incur losses. This violates the second 
condition of satisfying the budget constraint. 
Marginal cost pricing in its most drastic implementation implies different prices for each location 
and time period and prices that vary according to the level of local congestion. This requires real 
time meters to be present, which is not yet the case in all Member States and might therefore not 
be practically implementable. It may also lead to different prices for households that are connected 
to different feeder lines, even if they are located in the same city. This could be seen as unequal 
treatment, and therefore unfair. Different fairness criteria may conflict as well. Protecting 
vulnerable consumers might require cross-subsidies between consumer groups, which leads to 
inefficient pricing.100  
Current tariff becomes unsustainable 
The rationale for the historical tariff system, where tariffs are mainly based on the volume of 
energy consumption, was that it provided a good balance between fairness, efficiency and 
feasibility. Efficiency requires that prices correspond to the marginal cost of energy services. 
Lacking smart meters, short run marginal costs were hard to obtain, so long term marginal costs 
were used. Those long term marginal costs depend on the additional investment required to cope 
with growing peak demand. Hence, ideally a household should pay a tariff that corresponds to its 
contribution to peak demand. Its contribution is determined by its consumption level at times when 
aggregate network flows are highest. A capacity tariff (€/kW) would achieve this goal. As load 
profiles for residential consumers used to be very similar, charging consumers based on electricity 
volume was a very good proxy for the peak capacity requested by each consumer. Pricing at 
marginal costs would break the budget constraint of the network operator, and some remaining 
unrecovered costs, would still need to be paid for by consumers. This was done by increasing the 
tariff above the long term marginal cost. By setting a mark-up on consumption volumes, richer 
consumers with larger consumption would pay a greater share of the unrecovered costs, hence the 
broadest shoulders would carry the largest load. Given that consumption was very inelastic, 
efficiency losses associated with setting this mark-up were small, and were not considered.  
Under this traditional pricing scheme, production by small DER would often be accounted for as 
“negative load”. That means that it would be subtracted from total consumption. Lowering the net 
electricity consumption would lower the retail and distribution bill of households with distributed 
energy resources. Under this system, households receive an implicit compensation for 
decentralised production that is equal to the sum of their energy retail price and distribution tariff. 
This principle, sometimes also called “net metering”, is relatively simple to administer and provides 
additional incentives for self-production, which was seen as a bonus.  
A tariff system based on energy volume is, however, not future proof. With the internet of energy, 
those tariffs need to be adjusted, for several reasons.  
Demand profiles of consumers are no longer similar with the introduction of new technologies such 
as electric vehicles, local battery storage and heat pumps, see Simshauser (2014), Kufeoglu and 
                                               
100 Pollitt (2018) looks at four different pricing principles (cost reflective pricing, traditional public service pricing, 
platform market pricing and customer focused business model pricing) and highlights how they all reflect different 
objectives and trade-offs. 
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Pollitt (2019). The total energy consumption is therefore no longer a good measure for network 
costs that consumers impose on the network. This will typically lead to inefficiencies and could lead 
to cross-subsidisation, which are especially harmful if they occur from poor to rich households. 
In a case study for the Australian market, NERA (2014) compares the marginal network cost 
caused by households with air-conditioning to the network tariffs they pay. They show that the 
marginal costs are 2.4 times higher. The reason is that air conditioning has a direct impact on the 
system’s capacity needs because its use is contemporaneous with aggregate peak demand. This 
implies that consumers with air-conditioning pay less than their marginal cost, and that they are 
cross-subsidised by consumers without it. Hence, the tariff is inefficient and places a burden on 
consumers that are likely to be poorer.  
A similar argument exist against distributed generation in combination with net-metering (Brown 
and Sappington, 2017). Net metering assumes implicitly that the avoided network costs for 
distributed generation are equal to the marginal network cost for additional consumption. This is 
often not the case. Distributed generation may reduce energy losses in the network, but it requires 
additional investment in smart systems to facilitate integration. Moreover, network capacity might 
not be reduced one for one, as peak demand still needs to be met by the grid at times with little 
decentralised production. Hence net-metering is inefficient. It also implies a cross-subsidy of 
households with distributed energy sources by those without them. The latter are often vulnerable 
households without sufficient finances to invest in decentralised generation, or without property to 
build upon. A combination of net metering along with a high penetration of distributed generation 
may lead to a volatile income stream for the network operator, as its income would depend on the 
number of sunny days.  
The supply and demand of distributed energy sources is expected to become more elastic, both in 
the short run (operational decisions) and in the long run (investments in new equipment). Given 
the higher elasticity, setting tariffs above or below marginal costs reduces efficiency to a larger 
degree, as demand and supply quantities react more to tariff changes. Hence it becomes more 
important to set prices closer to marginal costs and carefully establish how the non-covered costs 
should be collected.101  
Smart meters and smart grids allow for a richer tariff structure than was possible in the past, and 
have lowered the cost of more innovative tariff designs. Direct information provision to customers 
and the automation of operational decision in expert systems (e.g. smart thermostats) make these 
richer tariff structure more palpable for end-users.  
Required changes in tariffs structure 
Given the higher demand and supply elasticities, grid tariffs need to become more closely aligned 
to the marginal network cost to improve efficiency. A first improvement, already possible without a 
smart meter, is to increase capacity tariff (€/kW) while reducing the volume tariff (€/kWh). This is 
beneficial, as marginal costs are more closely determined by capacity needs and less so by energy 
volume.  
Given that the network is a natural monopoly, setting tariffs equal to marginal cost will not cover 
the full cost of the network operator. Mark-ups will have to be set-upon the part of demand that is 
the least elastic. This is likely to involve connection charges (€/connection point) or additional 
capacity charges (€/kW). In 2005, the Netherlands switched to a system where all grid costs are 
                                               
101 Brown and Faruqui (2014) discuss the different options for cost recovery in more detail.  
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covered by connection charges for small households. Those connection charges do not depend on 
actual consumption or production and therefore do not influence production or consumption 
decision of prosumers.102 
Net-metering is gradually being phased out in Europe, with separate tariffs being recommended for 
consumption and generation. In their white paper on regulation, ACER and CEER (2017), state:  
“[…] European Energy Regulators recommend that, in Article 15 of the Electricity Directive, 
the reference to, “cost reflective, transparent and non-discriminatory network charges, 
accounting separately for the electricity fed into the grid and the electricity consumed from 
the grid” for prosumers be further developed to exclude the possibility of net metering.” 
Having separate consumption and generation tariffs provides the network operator also with more 
regulatory instruments to cover its network costs, which is more efficient (Brown and Sappington, 
2017). 
The availability of smart meters allows to set tariffs on the basis of short run marginal costs. This 
will be effective in alleviating congestion by reducing or time-shifting demand and or supply. This 
could be achieved by Locational Marginal Prices (LMP) at the distribution level.103 Along the same 
dimension also Time-of-Use tariffs, where the transmission tariff depends on pre-determined time 
slots,104 or critical peak tariffs, where the tariffs are higher during a small number of hours, 
indicated by the network operator, could be used.105  
As an alternative to dynamic network tariffs, a DSO could also rely on ancillary service markets for 
flexibility in that it procures local flexibility services from distributed energy resources, either 
directly or through aggregators. The good functioning of those flexibility markets requires clear 
baseline consumption and production levels. Those baselines are ideally based on network 
quantities that are contracted between network users and the network operator and will therefore 
require a network tariff which specifies a demand (or supply) profile with penalties for deviations 
from this profile. Alternatively baseline levels are based on some averaged consumer profiles, but 
this is likely to lead to some form of gaming.  
Abolishing net-metering and shifting to capacity tariffs will reduce cross-subsidisation from poor 
customers to rich consumers with air-conditioning and PV installation and improve the fairness of 
the tariff structure. However, some tariff changes might harm vulnerable consumers as well. They 
may for instance not be able to invest in equipment that supplies flexibility and end up paying 
more than other consumers. Moreover, a fixed connection charge (€/connection) will, in relative 
terms, be more costly for small consumers. For a more in depth discussion on fairness in 
distribution networks see Lu and Waddams Price (2018). 
In the long run, when the costs of storage and local generation are expected to drop further, then 
local energy communities might decide to partially or fully disconnect from the distribution network 
                                               
102 Schittekatte et al. (2018) model the consumer decisions in response to different tariff structures and show that a 
capacity charge (which does not differentiate between consumption and production) might lead to overinvestment in 
storage facilities by households.  
103 Locational Marginal Prices are typically used at the transmission level, but not at the distribution level. Technological 
progress might make this feasible at distribution level. See Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hsu (1997).  
104 In Spain, consumers can opt for Time-of-Use tariffs for their network uses. Preliminary evidence by Fabra et al. 
(2019) suggests that Spanish households adjust their consumption to those Time-of-Use prices.  
105 Borenstein (2005) shows significant long-run efficiency gains of real-time pricing compared to a flat price. He also 
indicates that Time-of-Use pricing can only capture a small fraction of those gains, as prices correlate poorly with the 
periods with critical peak demand, whereas Critical Peak Pricing captures a significantly larger share of those gains.  
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and operate on a stand-alone basis. The cost of the distribution network will then have to be 
covered by the remaining network users who will see their energy bills increase as a result. This 
could lead to a “death spiral” where more customers leave the distribution network (unlikely in 
northern Europe), network assets become stranded, the distribution network becomes obsolete and 
goes bankrupt, and only small island grids remain. This is not necessarily efficient: as consumers 
base their connection decisions upon a tariff that includes a compensation for stranded assets, 
which are no longer economically viable, then they disconnect from the network too often.  
5.2. Setting the correct incentives for distribution operators 
The integration of DER and the digitalisation of smart networks poses challenges for the DSO. 
These new challenges are likely to require a new regulatory framework, but could also imply that 
the market structure and allocation of responsibilities has to change. The next subsections list a 
number of challenges and possible remedies. 
Challenges 
Capital vs. operational costs – Distribution system operators face a trade-off between further 
expanding their network to deal with larger and more volatile demand, or to use their existing 
network more efficiently and actively manage the flows on the network, for instance by procuring 
storage or flexibility form network users.  
New tasks require new skills – At the distribution level many new tasks and goals have to be 
achieved. Distributed Energy Resources must be integrated, localised congestion needs to be 
managed, ancillary services have to be procured and new market players (e.g. energy 
communities, aggregators) need to be accommodated. Secure data infrastructure and 
communication platforms need to put in place. Those tasks may go beyond the skills of a small 
independent DSO, and it seems likely that large economies of scale will need to be exploited in 
order to operate efficiently. 
Preventing cross-subsidies – A regulated DSO that is vertically integrated with a retailer may be 
able to cross-subsidise its retail arm. This could lower the capital costs of this retailer and distort 
competition. If the future cost structure become more complex, it might become harder to allocate 
costs to specific functions and prevent cross-subsidisation.106  
Prevent discrimination – The future DSOs will have to procure ancillary services from market 
participants. Hence, the DSO will become an active market participant on the energy market. In 
order to guarantee a level playing field for all market participants, a vertically integrated DSO 
should not favour its own affiliate over its competitors.  
Innovation – The internet of energy is still in its infancy. Technology standards and 
interoperability requirements are still being developed, the market design has not yet crystallised 
and regulation (both national and EU-wide) is being developed as we go along. Distribution 
companies are intermediaries between many players, the enablers of the energy transition. For 
them to play this role, they need to have the freedom and incentives to innovate and take risks.  
Limited empirical evidence – Worldwide there are no good large scale examples on how the 
electricity sector should be organised (structure, regulation, technology) in order to integrate DER 
efficiently and equitably. The new European market design and regulation in this area remains 
untested.  
                                               
106 Willems and Ehlers (2008) discuss when cross-subsidies can be considered anti-competitive.  
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Possible remedies 
No EU harmonisation, but encourage learning – We do not see a clear rationale for 
harmonising regulation Europe-wide yet. Instead it is important that we learn from experimenting 
with different forms of regulation in Member States. Hence there is a value in variety. However, we 
might want to harmonise reporting requirements to improve mutual learning. Also, with respect 
DSO tariffs, we do not favour harmonisation; as the marginal costs for distribution networks differ 
across countries and different preferences exist across countries with respect to fairness.  
Regulation open to innovation – Member States should be encouraged to provide temporary 
deviations from existing regulation for small scale experiments (regulatory sandboxes). To promote 
innovation subsidies may be required, especially if there are regulatory spill-overs between DSOs, 
as we would expect too little investment in innovation otherwise. 
Regulation and market structure are interwoven – The regulatory framework will ideally 
depend on the market structure that is chosen (see section 4.2 for examples of market structures). 
Below we highlight three possible options.  
Option a: High powered incentive regulation of a large unbundled DSO 
One option to deal with some of the challenges above is to give a DSO a lot of flexibility but 
provide it with strong incentive regulation. An example of such regulation could be a price cap with 
a quality bonus and an efficiency improvement component.107 Under incentive regulation the NRA 
will not approve each individual decision by the DSO but will set monetary incentives. 108  
Once the DSO has the right incentives, it could determine for instance its own tariff structure and 
procure ancillary services under long term contracts. In order for DSOs to make the trade-off 
between capital costs (new network capacity) and operational costs (procuring flexibility) the DSO 
could be regulated on the basis of total expenditures (TOTEX).109 DSOs will have to cooperate with 
TSOs in minimising production costs. This requires an incentive scheme where the profit of the 
DSO depends on the performance of the TSO (and vice-versa).110  
This type of high-powered incentive regulation might not work whenever the DSO is part of a 
vertically integrated utility.111 This could be due to the fact that the DSO’s profit will only be small 
fraction of the integrated utility, and the regulatory incentives may in some cases conflict with the 
overall incentives of the company. Furthermore, as the DSO makes a lot of discretionary decisions 
under high-powered incentive regulation, it could discriminate against its competitors.112  
Ownership unbundling of the DSO will imply that the new DSO loses some know-how which was 
available in the vertically integrated firm. A small (ownership) unbundled DSO might therefore not 
be up to the tasks, and several smaller DSOs may have to merge. Unbundling will therefore 
drastically change market structures and its implementation is likely to take considerable time.113 
                                               
107 Price cap regulation has been used in the UK and the Netherlands, under an RPI-X regime.  
108 Armstrong and Sappington (206) section 3.1 highlights the benefits of flexibility in regulation in combination with 
incentive regulation.  
109 For instance, in the Netherlands DSOs are benchmarked against each other on the basis of TOTEX. By 
benchmarking companies, the regulator creates virtual competition between the regulated companies.  
110 This type of regulation depends on the theory of incentives in teams (Groves, 1973).  
111 Léautier and Thelen (2009) provide empirical evidence that a combination of incentive regulation and unbundling is 
required to improve investment decisions. See also Kim et al. (2017) for a discussion of a potential contractual 
framework that allows DSOs to have the primary economic responsibility for system balancing.  
112 The Netherlands requires full ownership unbundling of DSOs. Most member states require legal or functional 
unbundling, CEER (2018). 
113 In the Netherlands, the unbundling of DSOs took more than 10 years.  
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Some member states have introduced ownership unbundling requirements, while these are not 
being considered by others. 
Option b: Bring some market activities of the DSO to the TSO level 
An alternative option is to shift some tasks currently performed at the distribution level to the TSO. 
The TSO could for instance manage local congestion on the distribution network and procure local 
ancillary services.  
The advantages of this set-up is that synergies between the DSO and TSO level can easily be 
achieved, and that the know-how on setting-up and managing markets is already present at the 
TSO level. One of the disadvantages is that if distribution assets are still owned by the DSO then 
the coordination of local investment decisions and operational decisions becomes harder.  
Option c: Comprehensive regulation of vertically integrated network operators114 
In some Member States, DSOs are part of vertically integrated utilities. Vertical integration could 
help coordination between the different levels of the value chain, especially distribution and retail. 
For instance, the retail arm of an integrated utility could co-own storage facilities and share some 
of the risk with DER. Such an integrated utility is also likely to have sufficient economics of scale 
(and scope) and know-how to set-up local markets. 
The downside is that vertical integration could generate concerns about the potential limitations to 
effective competition, as discussed in section 3.1. NRAs control will therefore have to be more 
comprehensive and leave less flexibility to the DSOs than under incentive regulation (Option a). 
The procurement of local ancillary services will have to follow strict rules, guaranteeing a level 
playing field. Softer unbundling requirements (such management unbundling, information sharing 
requirements, technical protocols) may also need to be strengthened to make this option workable.  
  
                                               
114 Brunekreeft (2015) discusses the economic trade-offs of unbundling. Unbundling improves competition between 
market actors but might reduce coordination between retailer/generator and network operator.  
 
CERRE 2019 | Smart Consumers in the Internet of Energy: Flexibility Markets & Services from Distributed Energy Resources    65/84  
  
 
CERRE 2019 | Smart Consumers in the Internet of Energy: Flexibility Markets & Services from Distributed Energy Resources    66/84  
6. Conclusions and recommendations 
Demand for electricity has historically been predictable and price inelastic in the short run. 
However, the deployment of decentralised and weather-dependent generation pushes for a new 
paradigm where demand adjusts to intermittent supply. This paradigm reduces the pivotal role 
played by centralised generation and TSOs in the energy systems, requires a smarter and more 
flexible system (both technically and economically) and introduces new commercial and regulatory 
challenges. This report investigates these challenges and identifies possible solutions by reviewing 
the evidence from the literature and recent case studies.  
Regulations and Directives have played and continue to play an important role in the evolution of 
the European internal energy market. The “Clean Energy for all Europeans package” is the fourth 
set of rules established in order to promote the establishment and strengthening of the internal 
market and addresses the challenges of the energy transition. The Clean Energy Package brings 
forth an updated market design for electricity markets and proposes new principles regarding 
dynamic pricing, market access for demand response, the role of aggregators and energy 
communities and the regulation of TSOs and DSOs. The package has established a general 
framework, but it leaves practical implementation to Member States.  
Below we summarise some of the key findings and our main recommendations.  
Opportunities for smart consumers 
Demand side management and micro-generation have allowed consumers to participate more 
actively in the market. Indeed, the development of distributed generation, which enables 
consumers to become prosumers by selling their surplus electricity to the grid, is becoming 
important. There may be direct financial incentives for households/industrial consumers to be 
flexible, and they can participate directly in the energy market or through aggregators. Recently, 
we have witnessed the development of energy communities. Energy communities represent an 
interesting organisation as, beyond financial viability, they also value the creation of social capital 
and can generate wider benefits to participants, however they continue to face challenges in terms 
of financial viability, related, at least in part, to their inability to achieve an efficient scale. 
However, the associated regulatory framework is relatively vague. More guidelines to define and 
monitor energy communities should be in place. There is a need for specifying their role, rights and 
responsibilities to their members and the wider energy system. 
(New) drivers for electricity consumption 
It is well-known that energy consumers respond not only to price signals. Results from the 
liberalisation of the retail market offer various insights (rather than a clear and unique trend) into 
the behaviour of customers in power markets. For example, the different degrees of elasticity 
across consumers, the switching costs or the available information could all explain some customer 
inertia. More recently, customers’ preference for green energy has impacted the electricity market, 
where buyers may be willing to pay higher prices for electricity produced by renewable generation. 
There are also financial schemes being developed to incentivise prosumers to offer flexibility to the 
grid, in order to adjust to the higher supply volatility which arises from the increased reliance on 
intermittent generation. Finally, higher rates of electric vehicles penetration will increase electricity 
consumption. Smart charging can help with this by allowing a better distribution of charging over 
time, then reducing the use of the grid during peak hours.  
 
 
CERRE 2019 | Smart Consumers in the Internet of Energy: Flexibility Markets & Services from Distributed Energy Resources    67/84  
Key facts about new business models’ viability 
Projects and demonstration activities relying on innovative use of technology have been developed 
to promote consumer engagement and the provision of flexibility services. However different levels 
of success have been observed. While the emergence of aggregators as new market players can 
facilitate and promote the supply of flexibility services, it can also generate inefficiencies in the 
system. To correct for these inefficiencies, some form of compensation would be required that 
correctly accounts for the opportunity costs and lost revenues incurred by retailers. The evidence 
provided in this report regarding the emergence of trading platforms as systems that can facilitate 
an efficient use for DER does not clarify whether sufficient financial benefits will be available to 
consumers in order to motivate their engagement with a potentially complex system. Furthermore, 
despite the high expectations about wide-ranging opportunities offered by blockchain as a 
decentralised payment system and several emerging examples of blockchain based applications, 
doubts remain about its wider applicability in the energy system. As a result of our review of new 
business models, we have been able to identify some potential enablers for their financial viability 
such as technological options, favourable tariff schemes and environmental concerns. However, the 
lack of sufficiently-detailed data, the small size and voluntary nature of the projects and the 
different tariff structures applied in different countries make it difficult to assess whether the 
projects can be successfully scaled up to support the emergence of broader smart system. Since 
many of these projects are financed with public funds, we would recommend the development of 
guidelines for reporting on the results of the projects, possibly similar to the reporting rules 
introduced by the US Department of Energy for publicly funded projects, so that lessons can be 
learned from existing projects for future developments.115  
Allocating responsibilities between DSO-TSO 
Our analysis of the different approaches from Australia, the UK, New York and Europe (DSOs and 
TSOs associations) shows that most jurisdictions have not yet identified their preferred 
organisational set-up, including inter alia whether a central coordinator is necessary and whether 
this should be the DSO, TSO or a third party. The applicability of one case or another will depend 
on each jurisdiction’s existing regulatory environment, market structure and needs. A cost benefit 
analysis may help to identify the relative costs of different options, but many benefits and costs are 
hard to quantify. Key differences, such as the number, size and independence of the DSOs, should 
be taken into account in such a study as they differ significantly across Member States. 
Overhaul of tariff system 
With the internet of energy, traditional network tariffs need to be adjusted and become more cost 
reflective. Demand profiles of consumers are no longer similar across different consumers as a 
result of the introduction of new technologies, such as electric vehicles, local battery storage and 
heat pumps. The total energy consumption is therefore no longer a good measure for network 
costs imposed by consumers on the network. Incorrect tariffs will hamper the efficient development 
of a smart energy system. Given the higher demand and supply elasticities, grid tariffs need to 
become more closely aligned to network costs that consumers impose on the network. 
In a first instance we propose a change a tariff structure where the capacity component increases 
to the detriment of the volume component and accelerating the abolishment of net-metering. 
Having separate consumption and generation tariffs also provides the network operator with 
additional regulatory instruments to cover its network costs. The introduction of smart meters 
                                               
115 See for instance Cappers et al. (2013) for guidelines within the Smartgrid.gov program: 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/overview/consumer_behavior_studies.html  
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provides opportunities to further enhance network tariffs: a time-of-use tariff or tariffs where local 
congestion is reflected in the network tariff on an hour-by-hour basis. Aligning tariffs with network 
costs will alleviate some of the existing concerns about fairness and equity, where rich suburban 
homeowners with rooftop PV are ‘subsidised’ by other network user, but other concerns persist 
regarding access to smart technology for low income consumers. 
Smart DSO regulation 
The larger role of DSO in the future energy system will require more comprehensive regulation. 
Given the speed of the developments, incentive regulation where the regulator steers on outcomes 
and leaves flexibility to the DSO may be more appropriate than command and control regulation. 
In order for DSOs to make the trade-off between capital costs (new network capacity) and 
operational costs (procuring flexibility) the DSO may need to be regulated on the basis of total 
expenditures (TOTEX). DSOs will also have to cooperate with TSOs. This requires incentive 
schemes where the incentives for the DSO will depend on the performance of the TSO and vice-
versa. DSOs should be granted sufficient freedom and incentives to experiment and innovate (i.e. 
regulatory sandboxes). DSO also play an important role in supporting innovation by market 
participants. Transparency and long-term predictability on the rewards for local ancillary services 
and accommodating market access by different market actors will be key. 
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Appendix 1: Key features of case studies and projects 







Project SCENE Trent 
Basin 
Location California (USA) Amsterdam (NL) London (UK) Nottingham (UK) 
Assets 5 prosumers (and 5 
consumers) in 
2016, expanding to 
60 solar sites in 
2019 




102kWp solar array, 
40 Verv Home Hubs, 
communal batteries 
2.1MWh communal 
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Features of other projects    
 Feldheim 
Community 
Grid+ Isle of Eigg Isle of Gigha TenneT 
Location Feldheim 
(Germany) 
Texas (USA) Eigg (UK) Gigha (UK) Germany and 
Netherlands 
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Appendix 2: Glossary 
AEMO Australian Energy Market Operator (Australia), manages the National Energy Market 
(NEM), facilitates retail contestability, and responsible for national transmission 
planning.  
AI Artificial Intelligence  
AMP  Aggregator Management Portfolio (California)  
BEIS Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (UK) 
BMG Brooklyn Microgrid (USA) 
CAD Consumer Access Device, a relatively simple internet bridge between a smart meter 
and a cloud platform. 
CAISO California Independent System Operator (California) 
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis  
CE Community Energy  
CEER  Council of European Energy Regulators (Europe). Not-for-profit organisation in which 
Europe's national regulators of electricity and gas voluntarily cooperate to protect 
consumer' interests and to facilitate the creation of a single, competitive and 
sustainable internal market for gas and electricity in Europe 
CEP Clean Energy Package (EU) Set of 8 directives and regulations  
CPUC California Public Utilities Commission (California) Regulator 
DNO Distribution Network Operator (UK), company owning and operating distribution 
network.  
DNSP Distribution Network Service Provider (Australia), company owning and operating 
distribution network.  
DR Demand Response 
DRAM Demand Response Auction Mechanism (California) 
DRP Demand Response Provider (California)  
DSO Distribution System Operator (Network owner and System Operator) 
DSP Distribution System Platform (New York)  
DSPP Distributed System Platform Provider (New York)  
E-DSO European Entity for DSOs (EU) 
EEA European Environment Agency (EU) 
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ENA Energy Networks Association (UK) 
ENA Energy Networks Australia (Australia) 
ENA-CSIRO Energy Networks Australia and Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation 
ENTSO European Network of Transmission Systems Operators 
ENTSO-E  European Network of Transmission Systems Operators for Electricity 
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
ESO  Electricity System Operator 
EV  Electric Vehicles 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (USA) Federal regulator  
FES Future Energy Scenarios of National Grid (UK) 
FiT Feed-in Tariff  
HV High Voltage, Typically the transmission network 
ICT Information and Communication Technology  
iDSO Independent Distribution System Operator 
IOU Investor owned utility (USA) (In contrast to Public Owned Utility) 
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency 
I-RES:  Intermittent Renewable Energy Sources  
ISO Independent System Operator (mainly US), Operates system, does not own network  
ITO Initial Token Offering 
LV Low Voltage, Typically the low voltage distribution network 
MOL Merit Order List. A list of electricity bids sorted in order of their bid prices, used for the 
activation of those bids” 
NAO North Atlantic Oscillation  
NEMDE National Electricity Market Dispatch Engine (Australia) Name of dispatching 
optimization program 
NGESO National Grid ESO (UK)  
NY DPS New York Department of Public Service Commission (New York) Regulator 
NYISO New York Independent System Operator (New York) 
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OFGEM Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (UK) Regulator 
P2P Peer to Peer 
PDR Proxy Demand Resources (California) 
PGE Pacific Gas and Electricity, Utility 
PV Photovoltaic  
RA Resource adequacy (USA) Reliability standards  
RDRR Reliability Demand Response Resources (California) 
RES Renewable Energy Source  
REV Reforming the Energy Vision (New York) 
RTO Regional Transmission Operator (USA) Cooperation of several ISOs 
SC Scheduling Coordinator (California) (Similar to balancing responsible party in EU) 
SCE Southern California Edison, Utility 
SDGE San Diego Gas and Electricity, Utility  
SGAM Smart Grid Architecture Models (EU), A framework to describe the system architecture 
of smart grids. Developed by the Smart Grid Cooperation Group, consisting of CEN 
(European committee for standardization), CENELEC (European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization) and ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute).  
SSEN Scottish and Southern Electricity Networks (UK), Utility  
ToU Time of Use pricing 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
VHH Verv Home Hub: load monitoring device 
VLUX Public Token Exchange 
VPP Virtual Power Plants, aggregation of small distributed energy sources who jointly bid 
into the market as a virtual power plant.  
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